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64TH  CONGRESS  )  QFNATTT  (  DOCUMENT 

1st  Session       f  j     No.  334 


AMERICAN   POLICY  IN 
NICARAGUA 


MEMORANDUM 

ON  THE 

CONVENTION  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 

NICARAGUA  RELATIVE  TO  AN  INTEROCEANIC 

CANAL  AND  A  NAVAL  STATION  IN  THE 

GULF   OF    FONSECA,   SIGNED   AT 

MANAGUA,  NICARAGUA,  ON 

FEBRUARY  8,  1913 

BY 

GEORGE  T.  WEITZEL 

FORMER  AMERICAN  MINISTER  TO  NICARAGUA,  1912-13 


PRESENTED  BY  MR.  LODGE 
FEBRUARY  19,  1916.— Ordered  to  be  printed 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


AMERICAN  POLICY  LN  .NICARAGUA. 


Memorandum  by   UF.OKUK  T.  WEITZEL,  former  minister  to  Nicani.mia,    1912-13. 

The  necessity  for  putting  an  end  to  the  constant  disorders  in  Cen- 
tral America  and  thereby  removing  the  liability  of  European  inter- 
ference in  those  republics  has  been  generally  recognized,  and  numer- 
ous plans  have  been  proposed  to  bring  about  such  a  happy  result. 
For  many  years  the  United  States  was  content  with  making  mere 
representations  to  the  belligerents  or  expressing  "  grave  concern  "  for 
the  safety  of  its  citizens;  then  naval  vessels  were  sent  to  the  troubled 
regions  to  look  out  for  the  protection  of  any  Americans  or  foreigners 
that  might  be  within  reach  of  their  guns,  or  to  protest  occasionally 
against  barbarities  committed  by  the  combatants,  but  more  often  to 
carry  away  the  vanquished  chiefs  in  order  to  save  them  from  execu- 
tion by  their  victorious  enemies.  A  further  step  in  the  interest  of 
peace  was  taken  when  the  belligerents  were  invited  aboard  these 
vessels  to  discuss  and  compose  their  differences  with  the  friendly 
counsel  of  naval  and  diplomatic  officers  of  the  United  States;  and 
inasmuch  as  it  was  believed  to  be  desirable  to  have  the  cooperation 
of  a  Latin- American  country,  Mexico  was  later  invited  to  participate 
on  such  occasions.  In  these  circumstances  a  conference  was  held  in 
July,  1906,  on  board  the  U.  S.  S.  Marblehead,  attended  by  represen- 
tatives of  the  Central  American  Republics,  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
cussing terms  of  peace,  with  the  aid  of  the  good  offices  of  American 
and  Mexican  diplomatic  agents.  Among  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty  signed  on  the  Marblehead  was  one  requiring  that  all  future 
differences  should  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Presidents 
of  the  United  States  and  of  Mexico.  The  terms  of  the  treaty  were 
not  observed,  and  the  two  Presidents  were  accordingly  called  upon 
by  Guatemala  to  arbitrate  a  controversy  between  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua,  but  before  they  could  take  action  Zelaya,  the  President  of 
Nicaragua,  ousted  the  Government  of  Honduras,  established  a  friendly 
candidate  in  office,  and  thus  closed  the  matter  for  the  time  being. 

The  first  systematic  and  well-considered  effort  to  seek  a  remedy 
for  the  disorders  in  Central  America  was  made  by  President  Roose- 
velt in  the  Washington  peace  conventions  of  1907,  which  were  nego- 
tiated by  delegates  representing  all  five  Republics,  who  met  under  the 
joint  auspices  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  though  neither  of  the 
latter  Governments  was  a  signatory  of  the  treaties.  The  most  im- 
portant of  the  stipulations  are  those  providing  for  the  neutralization 
of  Honduras:  for  the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  territory  of  one 
State  to  incite  or  aid  insurrection  in  another;  and  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  Central  American  court  of  justice  at  Cartago,  Costa  Rica, 
to  settle  all  controversies.  Unfortunately  no  method  \v;is  then 


451646 


4  AMERICAN    POLIC1     UN"     IS  ICARAGUA. 

thought  of  or  has  since  been  devised  to  compel  observance  of  the  stipu- 
lations, and  as  a  consequence  they  have  been  frequently  violated. 
Each  of  the  States,  in  turn,  complained  of  aggressions  by  the  others, 
and  all  of  them  appealed  to  the  United  States  and  Mexico  for  the 
interposition  of  their  good  offices.  In  the  summer  of  1909  no  less 
than  six  American  and  two  Mexican  gunboats,  on  request  of  the  sev- 
eral Republics,  patroled  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  of  Central 
America  in  an  effort  to  intercept  filibustering  expeditions  and  to  pre- 
serve some  semblance  of  -order.  The  principal  offender  was  Presi- 
dent Zelaya,  of  Nicaragua,  who  was  not  only  disturbing  the  peace  of 
the  neighboring  Republics,  but  also  attempting  to  control  or  abolish 
the  Cartago  court. 

The  conventions  may  therefore  be  said  to  have  failed  of  their  pur- 
pose, except  in  so  far  as  they  have  committed  the  Central  American 
countries  to  certain  definite  principles  and  to  the  recognition  of  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  settlement  of  their  affairs.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  is  entitled  to  the  credit  for  being  the  first  to  seek  the 
cooperation  of  a  Latin- American  Government  in  the  settlement  of  a 
Latin-American  problem,  and  it  was  no  fault  of  the  United  States 
that  difficulty  arose  as  soon  as  it  became  necessary  to  put  into  practice 
the  theory  of  united  action.  When  the  Government  at  Washington, 
under  the  following  administration,  proposed  that  the  two  Powers 
should  cooperate  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  Honduras  and  com- 
pel observance  of  the  conventions,  Mexico  replied  that  it  was  unwill- 
ing to  go  so  far,  as  it  had  no  interest,  commercial  or  political,  to 
justify  interference,  except  in  the  bordering  State  of  Guatemala. 
President  Porfirio  Diaz,  frankly  admitting  his  obligation  to  Zelaya, 
said  he  did  not  wish  to  do  anything  to  embarrass  his  friend,  but  he 
gave  in  advance  an  indorsement  of  whatever  the  United  States  might 
see  fit  to  do  south  of  Guatemala.  This  virtually  brought  an  end  to 
the  cooperative  efforts,  and  thereafter  the  United  States  pursued  its 
policy  alone. 

Conditions  in  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  became  so  intolerable  that 
the  better  class  of  people  in  both  countries  appealed  to  the  United 
States  in  the  name  of  humanity  to  intervene  to  restore  order.  It  is  a 
debatable  question  whether  this  Government  would  not  have  acted 
wisely  to  accept  the  invitation  and  to  have  done  for  Nicaragua  what 
it  did  for  Cuba.  The  justification  fo*  such  a  course  AY  as  certainly  as 
urgent,  and  prompt  and  thorough  action  would  have  settled  the 
Central  American  problem  once  for  all.  However,  nothing  was  done 
until  in  December,  1909,  on  the  occasion  of  the  killing  of  two  Amer- 
icans by  order  of  Zelaya,  the  United  States  withdrew  its  recognition 
,of  him  and  broke  off  diplomatic  relations.  This  was  sufficient  to 
cause  his  downfall  and  flight  from  the  country,  and  the  overthrow 
of  his  representative  in  Honduras. 

The  time  then  seemed  favorable  for  making  another  attempt  to 
solve  the  Central  American  problem,  and  therefore  the  Department  of 
State  determined  to  try  to  reach  the  difficulty  by  reorganization  of  the 
finances  of  both  countries.  Accordingly,  a  loan  convention  was  signed 
in  1911,  first  with  Honduras  and  then  with  Nicaragua.  These^fol- 
lowed  the  plan  originally  worked  out  by  the  Roosevelt  administra- 
tion in  1907  in  the  Dominican  Republic.  The  theory  back  of  it  was 
to  prevent  disorders  by  taking  away  the  principal  financial  incentive 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN     NICARAGUA.  5 

to  revolution,  namely,  control  of  the  customshouses.  It  involved 
simply  the  refunding  of  the  public  debt  and  payment  of  all  foreign 
obligations  by  means  of  a  loan  obtained  in  the  United  States  and 
secured  by  the  customs  revenues  collected  under  the  supervision  of 
an  American,  and  thus  removed  from  likelihood  of  seizure  by  revo- 
lutionists. This  plan  worked  with  such  success  in  Santo  Domingo 
that  the  trade  of  that  country  increased  within  a  short  period  of 
years  almost  threefold;  and  the  augmented  revenue,  by  reason  of 
honest  and  efficient  collection,  not  only  adequately  provided  for  the 
governmental  needs  but  yielded  a  positive  surplus  actually  greater 
in  amount  than  the  total  revenue  of  the  State  prior  to  the  initiation 
of  the  new  system.  So  that  with  no  risk  to  ourselves  we  showed  how 
the  confused  finances  of  a  country  could  be  placed  on  a  sound  basis 
of  credit,  and  peace  thereby  maintained  through  our  generous  action 
without  imposing  an  unnecessary  or  unwelcome  interference. 

This  financial  plan,  as  applied  to  Nicaragua,  was  embodied  in 
the  Knox-Castrillo  loan  convention,  signed  at  Washington,  June  6, 
1911,  which  followed  closely  the  successful  Dominican  measure.  It 
was  promptly  passed  by  the  Nicaraguan  National  Assembly,  but  met 
with  opposition'  in  the  United  States,  and  a  motion  to  report  it  out 
of  the  Senate  committee  was  lost  by  a  tie  vote  in  May,  1912.  Two 
months  later  a  revolution  broke  out  in  Managua,  heaided  by  Gen.  Mena, 
minister  of  war,  who,  taking  advantage  of  his  cabinet  position,  not 
only  in  violation  of  his  oath  of  office  but  also  of  his  written  pledge 
to  the  United  States  and  its  minister,  made  a  treacherous  attempt 
to  seize  the  Government,  after  the  manner  of  Gen.  Huerta,  in  Mexico, 
but  without  success,  as  the  insurrection  was  eventually  put  down  by 
the  president,  Adolfo  Diaz. 

In  the  absence  of  the  Senate  approval  of  the  treaty,  the  United 
States  Government  did  not  assume  any  responsibilty  in  connection 
with  the  administration  of  Nicaraguan  customs  revenues.  However, 
the  Government  at  Managua,  while  waiting  for  ratification,  entered 
September  1,  1911,  into  a  purely  private  arrangement  of  a  tempo- 
rary nature  with  American  bankers  in  order  to  obtain  funds  urgently 
needed  until  the  large  loan  contemplated  by  the  treaty  should  become 
available.  As  security  for  the  temporary  loan,  which  amounted  to 
$1,500,000,  the  Nicaraguan  Government  pledged  its  customs  receipts 
and  agreed  that  they  should  be  collected  by  a  collector  general,  nomi- 
nated by  the  bankers  and  approved  by  the  "Secretary  of  State.  The 
proceeds  of  the  loan  were  used  to  reform  the  currency ;  to  retire  the 
depreciated  paper;  to  put  the  country  on  a  gold-exchange  basis;  to 
establish  a  national  bank;  and  to  pay  at  least  a  pro  rata  on  indemnity 
claims,  which  would  be  adjusted  by  a  mixed-claims  commission, 
composed  of  two  American  judges  and  one  Nicaraguan.  The  com- 
mission, by  a  special  law  of  Nicaragua,  was  also  given  power  to  pass 
on  the  status  and  ATalidity  of  all  concessions  granted  under  previous 
administrations. 

This  temporary  plan  has  worked  successfully,  notwithstanding 
embarrassments  caused  by  the  Mena  revolution,  but  it  suffers  from 
all  the  disadvantages  of  a  makeshift  measure.  The  Nicaraguan  Gov- 
ernment is  being  constantly  prodded  by  the  English  and  German 
Governments  for  the  payment  of  alleged  claims;  it  needs  at  least 
ten  or  twelve  million  dollars  to  refund  its  European  debt  of  about 


6  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

five  millions,  and  internal  obligations  and  claims  of  another  four 
millions,  not  to  mention  additional  sums  for  railroad  construction, 
education,  and  public  works.  This  large  loan  can  not  be  obtained  on 
favorable  terms  without  some  sort  of  treaty  which  will  guarantee 
peace  and  order  in  Nicaragua,  as  no  one  is  willing  to  invest  any  con- 
§iderable  amount  in  a  country  of  constant  disorders.  As  there  seems 
only  slight  prospect  that  the  Knox-Castrillo  convention  will  be  ap- 
proved by  the  Senate,  some  other  arrangement  will  apparently  have 
to  be  devised. 

A  new  plan,  embodied  in  the  canal  treaty,  which  was  negotiated 
by  Secretary  Knox  and  signed  by  the  American  minister  at  Managua, 
February  8,  1913,  proceeds  on  a  different  theory  from  all  the  pre- 
ceding measures.  Unlike  the  Washington  peace  conventions  it  re- 
gards Nicaragua,  because  of  important  strategic  considerations, 
rather  than  Honduras,  as  the  State  to  be  neutralized  and  pacified; 
and  it  differs  materially  from  the  Knox-Castrillo  loan  convention  in 
that  it  treats  the  financial  confusion  of  the  country  as  only  one  of 
the  elements  of  danger  that  must  be  remedied,  and  seeks  to  eradicate 
a  more  deeply  seated  source  of  trouble. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  earl}'  and  recent  history  of  Nicaragua 
will  show  that  the  numerous  disorders,  revolutions,  and  foreign  com- 
plications may  be  more  or  less  directly  traced  to  one  cause,  and  that 
if  any  permanent  peace  is  to  come  to  that  portion  of  the  continent 
this  cause  must  be  removed.  All  of  these  disturbances,  however 
confusing  and  unrelated  they  may  seem,  are  to  be  classified  under 
three  general  heads  as  international,  interstate,  and  internal. 

First.  By  international  disputes  are  meant  those  with  countries 
other  than  the  neighboring  republics.  In  early  times,  when  Central 
America  was  yet  a  colony  and  Spain  was  engaged  in  warfare  with 
England,  France,  and  Holland,  the  territory  of  Nicaragua,  on  ac- 
count of  its  strategic  position  between  the  two  seas  near  the  center 
of  the  narrow  isthmus  which  connects  the  northern  and  the  southern 
continents,  suffered  enormously  from  the  depredations  of  British, 
French,  and  Dutch  pirates  drawn  thither  because  of  tlife-  easy  means 
of  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans.' both  of 
which  they  were  searching  for  the  gold-bearing  galleons  of  Spain. 
In  1780  a  young  sea  captain,  who  afterwards  became  the  great  Ad- 
miral Lord  Nelson,  perceiving  in  an  early  stage  of  his  genius  the 
importance  of  the  territory,  attempted  to  win  for  his  sovereign 
control  of  the  Nicaraguan  canal  route,  and  at  the  head  of  a  naval 
expedition  began  the  ascent  of  the  San  Juan  Kiver,  but  was  com- 
pelled by  illness  to  give  up  the  effort  after  a  bitter  contest  Avith  the 
combined  forces  of  Spaniards  and  Indians.  Even  after  Nicaragua 
became  an  independent  republic  it  continued  to  be  an  object  of  atten- 
tion by  the  maritime  nations  of  'Europe.  England  seized  the  port 
of  San  Juan  del  Norte,  on  the  Atlantic,  in  1848 ;  took  possession  of 
Tigre  Island,  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  in  1849;  and  claimed  the  whole 
of  the  eastern  coast  as  a  protectorate,  this  latter  pretension  n^t  being 
given  up  until  1894,  during  the  Cleveland  administration.  The  fol- 
lowing year  British  warships  occupied  the  port  of  Corinto  in  order 
to  collect  a  claim  of  indemnity.  Similar  demands,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, served  as  the  pretext  of  the  ill-fated  attempt  of  the  third 
Napoleon  to  establish  Maximilian's  empire  in  Mexico,  which  had  for 
one  of  its  objects  the  extension  of  his  power  to  include  the  boundaries 
of  Nicaragua. 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  7 

There  exists  in  the  New  World — 
he  wrote  with  unrestrained  enthusiasm — 

a  State  as  admirably  situated  as  Constantinople,  and  we  must  say  up  to  this 
time  as  uselessly  occupied.  We  allude  to  the  State  of  Nicaragua.  As  Constan- 
tinople is  the  center  of  the  ancient  world,  so  is  the  town  of  Leon  the  center  of  the 
new,  and  if  the  tongue  of  land  which  separates  its  two  lakes  from  the  Pacific 
Ocean  were  cut  through,  she  would  command  by  virtue  of  her  central  position  the 
entire  coast  of  North  and  South  America.  The  State  of  Nicaragua  can  become, 
better  than  Constantinople,  the  necessary  route  of  the  great  commerce  of  the 
world,  and  is  destined  to  attain  an  extraordinary  degree  of  prosperity  and 
grandeur. 

The  union  of  Nicaragua  with  Mexico  was  not  original  with  Napo- 
leon, as  the  annexation  of  the  whole  of  Central  America  to  the  so-called 
Mexican  Empire  had  already  been  once  forcibly  accomplished  by 
Iturbide  in  1823,  and  continued  to  be  the  ideal  of  some  of  the  succes- 
sors of  that  ruler  until  recent  years,  when  the  United  States  was  called 
upon  to  protect  Central  America  from  Mexican  encroachment. 

The  southern  as  well  as  the  northern  neighbor  of  Central  America 
has  entertained  an  ambition  to  secure  control  of  Nicaragua.  The 
Republic  of  Colombia,  basing  its  action  on  what  Nicaragua  alleged 
was  a  long- forgotten  and  invalid  decree  of  a  Spanish  monarch,  set  up 
a  claim,  in  September,  1880,  to  the  entire  Atlantic  coast  of  Central 
America  as  far  north  as  Cape  Gracias,  the  apparent  purpose  being  to 
frustrate  the  negotiations  which  were  then  going  on  between  the 
United  States  and  Nicaragua,  and  which  eventually  culminated  in 
the  signing  of  the  Frelinghuysen-Zavala  canal  treaty.  Colombia  fol- 
lowed up  its  formal  communication  on  the  subject  by  preparing,  some 
years  later,  to  send  forces  to  seize  Great  Corn  Island,  at  the  eastern 
entrance  to  the  proposed  canal,  but  President  Cleveland,  desirous  of 
preventing  hostilities  between  the  two  sister  Republics,  dispatched 
the  U.  S.  S.  Boston  to  the  scene  of  disputed  jurisdiction  with  instruc- 
tions to  continue  to  recognize  the  established  authority. 

In  all  of  these  cases  of  Nicaraguan  international  controversies  with 
Europe,  Mexico,  and  Colombia  the  real  cause  of  the  trouble  was  the 
desire  to  control  the  interoceanic  canal  route. 

Second.  By  interstate  disputes  are  meant  those  which  relate  to 
the  Central  American  Republics  exclusively.  Nicaragua  and  the 
other  four  countries — Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador,  and  Costa 
Rica — were  organized  in  1823  in  a  federation  called  the  "United 
Provinces  of  Central  America."  From  its  inception  there  was  con- 
stant turmoil,  due  to  the  jealousies  of  the  several  component  States 
and  to  the  rivalries  of  their  respective  leaders.  Guatemala  and  Sal- 
vador engaged  in  a  bitter  warfare,  the  unhappy  results  of  which  may  be 
seen  even  at  the  present  day.  The  suffering  from  the  chronic  disorders 
and  anarchy  became  so  intolerable  that  the  people  of  Salvador,  de- 
sirous of  peace  (they  had  petitioned  the  United  States  to  be  annexed, 
during  the  troubles  with  the  Mexican  Empire),  seceded  from  the 
Central  American  Union.  Its  action  was  followed  by  Costa  Rica, 
the  federation  dissolved,  and  its  last  president,  Morazan,  was  cap- 
tured and  executed.  Numerous  efforts  have  since  been  made  with- 
out success  to  restore  the  union,  notably  in  1851  and  1863,  not  to 
mention  Zelaya's  many  futile  schemes.  The  most  daring  attempt, 
however,  was  undertaken  in  1885  by  Gen.  Rufino  Barrios,  President 
and  dictator  of  Guatemala,  who  sought  to  put  his  plan  into  effect  be- 
fore the  ratification  of  the  Frelinghuysen-Zavala  canal  treaty  which 


8  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

had  been  signed  by  the  United  States  and  Nicaragua.  A  period  of 
bloody  warfare  seemed  unavoidable  and  was  averted  only  by  the 
death  of  Barrios  who  was  unexpectedly  slain  in  battle  with  the 
Salvadorans. 

In  a  word,  most  of  the  conflicts  among  the  Central  American  States 
have  resulted  from  the  ambition  of  the  most  powerful  dictators  to 
impose  their  rule  on  the  adjacent  countries  and  gradually  to  em- 
brace them  all  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  reestablishing  the 
union,  but  with  the  real  object  of  controlling  the  canal  route  across 
Nicaragua. 

Third.  By  internal  disputes  are  meant  those  which  concern  the 
people  of  Nicaragua  alone.  These  may,  for  the  most  part,  be  as- 
cribed to  the  bitter  hostility  between  the  cities  of  Granada  and  Leon 
and  to  their  bloody  struggles  for  supremacy,  the  germs  of  which 
are  said  to  be  traceable  back  to  pre-Colombian  times.  In  colonial 
days  Leon  was  the  capital,  the  seat  of  a  bishopric,  and  the  site  of 
a  garrison,  and  as  such  had  become  the  residence  of  the  civil,  re- 
ligious, and  military  authorities  sent  from  Spain  to  govern  the  coun- 
try. On  the  other  hand,  Granada,  by  virtue  of  its  advantageous 
position  at  the  head  of  the  great  lake,  which  at  one  time  could 
be  visited  by  light-draft  vessels  from  the  Atlantic,  grew  to  be  the 
center  of  the  trade  and  wealth  of  the  colony,  and  this  nobility  class, 
as  it  called  itself,  being  denied  any  voice  in  the  government  at  Leon, 
raised  the  cry  of  independence.  Even  after  separation  from  Spain 
in  1821  their  mutual  antagonism  did  not  cease,  and  for  more  than 
30  years  following  the  organization  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Central  America,  Nicaragua  remained  in  a  constant  condition  of 
anarchy,  with  a  succession  of  brawling  governments,  against  which 
mutiny  at  Leon  alternated  with  treason  at  Granada,  both  cities  being 
several  times  partially  destroyed,  each  in  turn  supporting  or  oppos- 
ing the  federation  whenever  such  action  gave  promise  of  gaining  for 
it  the  ascendancy  over  its  enemy,  until  finally  both  declared  for  seces- 
sion in  order  to  fight  out  their  differences  without  interruption  by 
the  central  authority. 

For  similar  reasons  they  took  opposing  sides  on  the  canal  question, 
and  when  the  acquisition  of  California  made  the  construction  of  an 
interoceanic  route  across  the  isthmus  a  matter  of  economic  as  well  as 
political  importance  for  the  United  States,  Granada,  as  the  champion 
of  commercial  development  in  Nicaragua,  favored  the  enterprise, 
while  Leon,  though  friendly  to  the  United  States,  as  the  better  class 
of  its  people  has  always  been,  continued  to  oppose  any  measures  that 
would  supposedly  contribute  to  the  advantage  of  its  rival.  So  popu- 
lar, however,  was  the  canal  idea,  and  so  strong  the  sentiment  for 
trade  development  and  for  encouraging  our  assistance,  that  beginning 
in  1858  and  continuing  for  35  years  the  Granada  faction  controlled 
the  Government,  and  by  observing  the  constitutional  requirements 
and  electing  a  series  of  able  Presidents,  gave  Nicaragua  a  long  era  of 
peace,  which  is  without  parallel  in  Central  America,  and  which  at 
last,  because  of  local  dissensions,  was  brought  to  an  end  in  1893  by 
Zelaya,  who  opposed  canal  construction  under  Ainerican  auspices. 

In  brief,  it  may  be  said  that  the  canal  question  is  the  principal 
disturbing  issue  in  Nicaraguan  affairs,  whether  international,  inter- 
state, or  internal;  and  this  is  none  the  less  true,  even  though  the 


AMEKK'AN     POLK'Y     IX    NICARAGUA.  9 

Panama  route  has  long  since  been  chosen  as  the  world's  highway  of 
commerce.  It  still  offers  to  the  cupidity  of  the  professional  revolu- 
tionist a  prize  as  valuable  as  the  possession  of  the  customhouses 
and  affords  as  much  as  ever  an  opportunity  for  intrigues  among  the 
Central  American  Republics  and  a  basis  for  negotiation  with  for- 
eign countries,  if  not  a  provocation  for  their  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  Nicaragua.  Thus  in  June,  1910,  according  to  a  "consular 
report,  the  executive  delegate  of  Zelaya  proposed  to  the  British  min- 
ister at  Guatemala,  through  an  agent,  that  in  consideration  of  Eng- 
lish intervention  and  protest  against  alleged  illegal  interference  by 
the  United  States,  which,  he  declared,  prevented  the  restoration  of 
order  and  was  therefore  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  British  sub- 
jects domiciled  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  the  Nicaraguan  Government 
would  cede  Great  Corn  Island  to  Great  Britain  for  a  coaling  sta- 
tion. Perhaps  no  better  light  can  be  thrown  on  this  aspect  of  the 
matter  and  of  the  way  in  which  the  canal  question  was  treated  by 
a  certain  faction  of  the  Leon  liberals  when  in  control  of  the  Govern- 
ment than  by  the  quotation  of  several  paragraphs  of  an  instruction 
addressed  by  Zelaya's  minister  of  foreign  affairs  to  the  Nicaraguan 
minister  at  Paris  on  April  29,  1908,  as  shown  by  the  official  archives 
in  Managua : 

You  no  doubt  are  aware  of  the  turn  of  the  policy  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia 
with  relation  to  Panama  and  the  United  States,  chiefly  in  regard  to  the 
opening  of  the  canal,  tending  at  present  to  make  closer  their  relations  with 
Japan  and  showing  overtly  their  intentions  to  enter  formally  into  negotiations 
having  to  do  with  the  canal  south  of  the  Panama  Canal  and  to  induce  Japanese 
immigration  into  their  territory,  etc. 

We  are  well  acquainted  with  the  desires  of  aggrandizement  of  the  Japanese 
Empire  and  the  spirit  of  the  Government  of  Colombia,  which  never  will 
forget  the  secession  of  its  important  department,  influenced  by  the  United 
States,  and  which  in  its  excited  desire  to  win  back  what  it  has  lost  grasps  at  any 
project  whatsoever  which  is  offered  to  it  as  a  realization  of  its  hopes.  In 
view  of  this  it  is  not  impossible  that  what  is  now  considered  doubtful  may 
later  be  consummated  if  possible  obstacles  do  not  interfere. 

Nicaragua  can  not  remain  indifferent  before  such  eventualities.  As  you 
know  positively  the  canal  through  our  country  offers  at  all  times  various  ad- 
vantages over  that  of  Panama,  and- that  it  was  international  policy  which  re- 
solved the  selection  of  this  last-mentioned  route ;  also,  that  the  present  proposal 
of  the  Colombians  presents  innumerable  disadvantages. 

But  even  withdrawing  from  this  point  of  view  and  supposing,  as  is  most 
likely,  that  in  the  end  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  the  only  canal,  yet  we  have 
to  take  into  account  that  the  United  States  fears,  and  rightly,  that  another  or 
other  powers  may  render  null  and  void  a  great  part  of  their  tremendous  labor. 
And  in  this  sehse  it  is  indubitable  that  Colombia  or  Nicaragua  may  obtain  no 
inconsiderable  political  advantage  from  the  insecure  or  be  it  false  position  in 
which  the  United  States  finds  itself. 

Now,  through  the  instrumentality  of  a  certain  English  consul  to  this  coun- 
try who  may  be  well  informed  in  the  premises  we  have  learned  that  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  have  lately  concerted  the  idea  of  the  canal  by  way  of 
Nicaragua.  *  *  * 

It  is  uiy  wish,  therefore,  that  you,  in  an  absolutely  personal  character  and 
with  the  greatest  possible  care  and  discretion,  should  talk  with  the  Japanese  am- 
bassador in  Paris,  saying'that,  although  you  are  not  in  possession  of  instructions 
from  your  Government  to  the  effect,  you  would  venture  if  the  Government  of 
Japan  should  send  agents  to  Nicaragug,;the  overtures  which  they  might  make 
in  connection  with  this  important  umtter  would  be  very  well  received.  All 
this  without  putting  on  paper  a  single  word  of  your  conversations. 

You  are  not  to  forget  that  this  matter  is  of  the  utmost  confidence,  for  as  you 
will  plainly  understand  that  If  the  United  States  were  prematurely  to  get  wind 
of  our  proceedings,  whatever  we  might  do  in  the  matter  would  cost  us  dear. 


10  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

If  success  is  ours  we  shall  procure  at  the  very  least  most  enviable  political 
advantages,  above  all  greater  consideration  and  respect  from  the  United  States, 
and  it  may  be  an  enviable  position  in  respect  to  Central  America. 

The  Chamorro-Weitzel  treaty,  as  the  Knox  measure  signed  at 
Managua  is  called,  has  been  drawn  on  the  theory  that  it  would 
not  only  set  at  rest  for  all  time  the  control  of  the  canal  route,  and 
thus  remove  it  from  being  a  possible  cause  of  international  complica- 
tions, but  also  that  it  will  afford  a  solution  of  the  interstate  question 
of  a  Central  American  Union,  and  tend  to  allay  the  internal  troubles 
growing  out  of  the  animosities  between  Leon  and  Granada. 

By  the  treaty  a  perpetual  and  exclusive  option  is  conceded  to  the 
United  States  to  build  an  interoceanic  canal  across  the  territory  of 
Nicaragua,  the  details  and  terms  of  the  construction,  operation,  and 
maintenance  of  such  canal  being  left  for  determination  later  by 
mutual  consultation  between  the  two  Governments  and  until  such 
time  as  the  actual  construction  should  be  decided  upon.  There  is  fur- 
ther granted  to  the  United  States  the  right  to  maintain  a  naval  sta- 
tion in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  should  this  be  deemed  expedient,  and  the 
lease  for  99  years  of  Great  and  Little  Corn  Islands  in  the  Caribbean; 
and  to  stimulate  commerce  it  is  provided  that  American  ships  shall 
enjoy  the  privileges  of  Nicaragua  coastwise  trade.  In  consideration 
of  the  foregoing  the  United  States  Government  undertakes  to  pay 
$3,000,000,  in  trust,  to  be  used  for  general  education,  public  works, 
and  for  the  advancement  of  the  welfare  of  Nicaragua,  all  disburse- 
ments being  made  subject  to  the  joint  supervision  of  the  secretary  of 
state  at  Washington  and  the  minister  of  finance  in  Managua. 

The  benefits  to  Nicaragua,  besides  the  cash  payments,  are  the 
guaranty  of  the  peace  and  independence  of  the  Republic,  the  develop- 
ment of  its  great  resources  through  capital  drawn  to  the  country, 
the  prospect  that  some  day  the  canal  may  be  constructed,  and  finally 
the  removal  of  a  constant  incentive  to  disorders.  Corresponding  ad- 
vantages to  the  United  States  are  the  elimination  of  foreign  political 
influence  in  Nicaragua,  the  prevention  of  any  issue  arising  under 
the  Monroe  doctrine  or  the  Lodge  resolution,  the  service  of  a  caveat 
against  any  more  canal  concessions  or  territorial  privileges,  and  the 
preparation  for  the  future  growth  of  our  coastwise  commerce  by 
shortening  the  interoceanic  route.  Furthermore,  an  American  naval 
station  in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca.  the  safest  and  most  strategic  harbor 
on  the  Pacific  south  of  San  Francisco,  would  be  not  only  an  impor- 
tant element  in  the  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal  but 'would  also, 
through  the  power  of  publicity  thus  given  to  Central  American 
affairs,  afford  the  most  effective  means  of  guaranteeing  the  observ- 
vance  of  the  Washington  conventions. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  our  policy  in  Nicaragua  as  thus  out- 
lined has  met  with  criticism.  Some  of  it  comes  from  those  who  sin- 
cerely but  lightly  believe  that  the  Central  American  States  should  be 
left  to  the  fate  which  Bismarck  so  generously  suggested  for  France 
when  he  said :  "  Let  her  cook  in  her  own  gravy."  There  are  more- 
over a  few  critics  whose  opinions  are  not  of  such  a  negative  character, 
and  who  declare  with  great  positiveness  that  "vested  interests,"  monop- 
olies, and  concessions  should  not  be  disturbed  by  the  new  order  in  Nic- 
aragua ;  there  are  others,  having  European  affiliations,  who  can  see  no 
good  purpose  whatsoever  in  extending  American  influence  on  this  con- 
tinent ;  and  finally  there  are  the  partisans  of  Zelaya  who  are  loudest 
of  all  in  their  complaints,  for  reasons  that  will  hereinafter  appear. 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  11 


Th^criticismsoi our  policy,  so  far  as  they  can  be  ascertainedfrom 
pamphlets  anthprints  of  various  kinds,  are  about  as  follows  i^^yThat 
the  United  States  to  cover  its  design  of  ousting  Zelaya  and  the 
Liberals  from  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  made  use  of  the  friv- 
olous pretext  of  seeking  redress  for  the  killing  of  two  Americans; 
£ft£  that  Madriz,  another  Liberal,  the  successor  of  Zelaya,  was  the 
constitutional  Presidentand  should  have  been  recognized  as  such  by 
the  United  States ;  dfp^  that  the  conservative  Government  which 
followed  the  Zelaya-Madriz  regime  was  corrupt  and  despotic,  and 
the  program  of  financial  reorganisation  for  which  it  was  sponsor 
worked  injustice  to  Nicaragua ;  (£4)  that  the  landing  of  marines  at 
the  time  of  the  Mena  revolution  was  an  unprecedented  violation  of 
territory,  and  their  retention  in  Managua  is  the^tf^y  thing  that  pre- 

the 


vents  the  downfall  of  the  Diaz  administration;  d^5/'that  the  Liberals 
are  in  an  overwhelming  majority  in  Nicaragua  and  would  win  the 
presidency  if  guaranteed  honest  elections  under  United  States  super- 
vision; (6)  that  at  least  they  are  entitled  to  share  in  a  coalition  gov-( 
ernment  and  obtain  half  the  offices;  (7)  that  the  pending  canal 
treaty  is  against  public  interest  not  only  because  it  is  unpopular  in 
Nicaragua,  but  also  in  that  it  violates  the  rights  of  the  other  Central 
American  States;  (8)  that  the  canal  treaty  is  further  objectionable 
because  it  will  pravent  a  union  of  Central  America  into  a  single 
strong  republic  ;  ^p  that  the  whole  policy  of  the  Un  ited  States  is  an 
offense  against  tne  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua  and  an  affront  to  all 
Latin  America. 

These  complaints,  if  founded  on  a  basis  of  truth  and  not  on  a 
mere  distortion  of  facts,  which  were  intended  to  influence  the  unin- 
formed for  ulterior  purposes,  would  constitute  a  serious  reflection 
on  the  good  faith  of  the  United  States  and  would  deserve  careful 
consideration  and  appropriate  action.  Taking  them  in  order,  a  brief 
examination  may  be  made  of  each  to  determine  the  merits  of  the  casu. 

The  first  is  that  the  United  States,  to  cover  its  design  of  ousting 
Zelaya  and  the  Liberal  Government  in  Nicaragua,  used  as  a  pretext 
for  accomplishing  this  purpose  that  it  was  seeking  redress  for  the 
killing  of  two  Americans,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  latter  were 
mere  soldiers  of  fortune,  who  deserved  the  treatment  they  received. 

In  reply,  it  may  be  said  that  the  United  States  -nppflp.fi  no 
for  its  action  in  taking  measures  to  safc^uard'^iiierican 
•property,for  a  condition  of  such  barbarism  prevailed  in  Nicaragua/ 
'  on  tae  gronncTof  s 


humanity,  as  in  Cuba,  and  the  complete  occupation  of  the  country  to 
restore  oVcler.  Instead  of  taking  such  thorough  action,  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  rested  content  with  giving  the  Nicai-aguan  charge 
d'affaires  his  passports  ji.fter  the  facts  of  the  execution  had  been 
verified. 

The  details  of*  that  celebrated  case,  as  gathered  from  the  Nica- 
ragua court  records,  are  as  follows:  In  October,  1909,  a  revolution 
against  Zelaya,  then  president,  of  Nicaragua,  was  proclaimed  by 
Juan  Estrada  at  Bluefields.  Two  Americans,  Cannon  and  Groce, 
joined  the  revolutionists,  and  were  commissioned  as  officers.  Both 
had  suffered  from  Zelaya  *s  persecution,  and  as  one  was  a  civil  engi- 
neer and  the  other  an  experienced  miner,  they  together  with  a  man 
named  Couture,  a  French  citizen,  were  put  in  charge  of  the  work 
of  defending  the  San  Juan  River  by  submarine  mines  against  expe- 


12  AMERICAN    POLICY    IX    NICARAGUA. 

ditions  sent  from  the  capital  to  the  Atlantic  coast.  In  the  course  of 
their  operations  the  three  men  became  lost  in  the  forest,  and  after 
wandering  several  days  gave  themselves  up  to  the  opposing  forces 
as  prisoners  of  war.  Zelaya  at  once  ordered  a  summary  court  mar- 
tial, and  issued  strict  commands  that  they  be  not  allowed  to  com- 
municate with  any  one.  To  prevent  notice  of  their  plight  reaching 
the  public,  and  to  forestall  any  interference  by  American  naval  ves- 
sels, the  prisoners  were  removed  from  Greytown  on  the  coast  to  an 
inland  village,  and  within  40  minutes  of  their  arrival  put  on  trial. 
They  were  charged  with  exploding  mines,  but  the  records  were 
afterwards  doctored  so  as  to  make  it  appear  that  they  had  been 
convicted  of  "rebellion,"  whatever  that  may  mean.  Even  though 
nobody  had  been  injured  by  their  alleged  offense,  the  two  Americans 
were  condemned  to  death  and  the  Frenchman  given  a  year  in  jail. 
Zelaya  evidently  considered  it  a  much  more  serious  offense  to  be  an 
American  than  to  be  a  Frenchman. 

The  United  States  consul  at  Managua,  hearing  at  2  a.  in.  of  the 
plight  of  his  fellow  countrymen,  communicated  with  Zelaya,  and 
asked  that  the  execution  be  delayed  until  he  could  make  an  exami- 
nation of  the  case  and  report  it  to  the  department.  Zelaya  replied 
at  2  p.  m.  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  matter  but  would  investigate. 
He  had  already  determined  to  frustrate  any  action  by  the  United 
States,  and  two  hours  before,  at  12.11  noon,  had  sent  a  telegram 
ordering  that  the  sentence  should  be  carried  out  at  once.  The  rec- 
ords also  show  that  Gen.  Toledo,  who  was  the  proper  officer  to  have 
conducted  the  trial,  and,  as  such,  authorized  to  reduce  the  sentence, 
telegraphed  to  Zelaya  requesting  that  the  lives  of  the  condemned 
men  be  spared.  This  plea  for  clemency  evidently  caused  the  dictator 
to  believe  that  Toledo  might  endeavor  to  delay  the  result,  so  he  sent 
a  second  telegram  at  6.30  p.  m.  to  Gen.  Medina,  the  trial  judge,  order- 
ing him  to  proceed  with  the  execution  of  the  two  Americans.  There 
was  still  a  short  delay,  because  the  captain  of  the  firing  squad  de- 
nounced the  proceedings  and  declined  to  give  the  command  of  exe- 
cution. He  was  flogged  and  threatened  with  death,  but  resolutely 
refused  to  carry  out  the  order.  Another  captain  was  chosen,  the  two 
Americans  were  quickly  shot,  November  16,  and  their  bodies  thrown 
into  a  ditch.  The  fiscal,  or  prosecuting  officer,  thereupon  telegraphed 
the  result  to  Zelaya,  and  added,  "  I  shall  continue  to  carry  out  the 
law,  and  above  everything  your  orders."  He  was,  in  truth,  carrying 
out  "  orders,"  for  there  is  no  law,  municipal  or  international,  against 
an  alien  taking  arms  with  either  side  engaged  in  warfare ;  the  United 
States  welcomed  the  assistance  of  foreigners  in  its  own  revolution, 
and  all  civilized  nations  recognize  the  principle  that  such  aliens  when 
captured  must  be  given  the  same  rights  as  other  prisoners  of  war. 
Even  confessed  criminals  would  have  been  entitled  to  greater  con- 
sideration than  was  shown  to  the  two  Americans  by  Zelaya.  Their 
summary  execution,  when  the  facts  were  made  public,  aroused  the 
greatest  indignation  throughout  the  United  States. 

A  joint  resolution  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  December  10,  1909, 
by  Senator  Eayner,  of  Maryland,  reciting  that — 

Whereas  the  execution  of  prisoners  of  war  *  *  *  is  contrary  to  the  mili- 
tary code  of  Nicaragua,  is  in  violation  of  international  law,  and  constitutes 
the  crime  of  murder  under  every  code  of  military  warfare  now  recognized  by 
civilized  communities;  *  *  *  resolved  *  *  *  that  the  President  of  the 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  13 

United  States  be,  und  he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  take  all  necessary  steps  for  the 
apprehension  of  Zelaya,  the  alleged  perpetrator  of  the  crime,  and  to  bring  him 
to  trial  therefor ;  and  that  he  be  further  authorized  to  use  whatever  methods 
and  process  may  be  necessary  to  accomplish  this  purpose. 

The  Senator  characterized  Zelaya  as  a  highwayman,  a  tyrant,  a 
usurper,  and  an  assassin. 

In  the  school  of  corruption,  dishonor,  perfidy,  and  crime  he  stands  without 
a  peer.  *  *  *  Now,  as  the  culminating  infamy  of  his  administration,  tram- 
pling upon  every  instinct  of  humanity,  in  violation  of  universal  law,  in  defiance 
of  those  precepts  of  the  international  code  that  have  been  recognized  ever  since 
the  night  of  barbarism  receded  before  the  rays  of  civilization,  he  has  put  to 
torture  and  then  to  death  two  American  citizens.  *  ":  *  This  act  was  not 
only  the  act  of  a  fiend,  but  was  an  insult  to  the  honor  of  this  Republic,  and  can 
not  remain  unavenged.  *  *  *  The  proper  step  to  take  is,  therefore,  in  my 
judgment,  that  which  is  embodied  in  the  language  of  the  resolution,  and  that  is, 
by  every  process  and  method  that  may  be  necessary  to  apprehend  the  murderer 
and  bring  him  to  trial.  This  Government  is  a  cowardly  Government  if  it  does 
not  make  an  example  of  Zelaya  before  the  eyes  of  the  civilized  world.  This 
case  will  not  admit  of  any  trifling  or  concessions.  If  two  American  citizens — 
I  care  not  who  they  were  or  what  they  were ;  citizens  in  high  standing,  as  they 
have  been  reputed  to  be,  or  soldiers  of  fortune — have  been  murdered  by  Zelaya, 
then  he  must  be  made  to  pay  the  penalty  of  his  crime. 

Senator  Lodge,  of  Massachusetts,  commenting  on  his  colleague's 
argument,  thus  expressed  himself: 

I  am  very  glad  that  the  Senator  from  Maryland  approves  so  strongly  the  atti-V 
tude  and  the  course  of  action  taken  by  the  administration.     I  myself  cordially 
and  heartily  approve  it,  and  I  am  sure  that  it  meets  with  general  approval  and 
support.    I  do  not  think  anyone  will  differ  with  him  materially  as  to  the  char-- 
acter  of  Zelaya,  but  the  practical  question  which  is  presented  to  me  is  one  of 
very  great  difficulty.     How  can  we  separate  the  criminal  from  the  innocent 
country  and  people  whom  he  has  involved  in  his  crimes,  and  how  can  we  best 
exact  the  reparation  due  to  us  for  what  can  only  be  called  the  murder  of  our 
citizens? 

Not  only  in  the  United  States,  but  also  in  Nicaragua  and  through- 
out Central  America,  Zelaya's  act  of  barbarity  was  condemned.  Even 
Madriz,  who  succeeded  him,  the  ablest  lawyer  among  the  Liberals, 
in  a  letter  of  January  7,  1910,  regarding  the  execution  of  Cannon 
and  Groce,  said: 

After  a  personal  study  of  the  circumstances  in  which  that  deed  was  com- 
mitted I  deplore  it  as  illegal,  and  I  consider  as  just  the  resentment  which  for 
that  reason  is  felt  in  the  minds  of  the  Government  and  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  The  Nicaraguan  Government  will  do  everything  necessary  to 
give  complete  satisfaction  for  that  resentment  and  will  await  with  a  spirit 
entirely  friendly  and  rigorously  observant  of  justice  of  the  demands  of  the 
American  Government,  and  will  make  reparation  with  the  best  good  will  at> 
soon  as  possible  for  the  evil  caused  by  that  unfortunate  event. 

The  second  criticism  is  that  Mr.  Madriz,  who  was  the  successor  of 
Zelaya,  became  the  constitutional  President  of  Nicaragua  and  should 
have  received  recognition  as  such  by  the  United  States. 

To  this  claim  the  department  responded  that  his  Government  was 
neither  de  jure  nor  de  facto,  and  it  refused  to  recognize  either  faction 
in  Nicaragua,  but  announced  its  determination  to  hold  each  of  the 
leaders  responsible  for  the  protection  of  American  life  and  property 
in  the  territory  under  his  immediate  control^  " 

Unfortunately  for  the  contention  made  by  his  partisans,  Madriz, 
before  he  had  any  expectation  of  becoming' the  heir  of  Zelaya,  had 
proven  conclusively  in  a  vigorous  legal  treatise  "  that  Zelaya  is  a 


14  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

dishonest  public  official  who  has  trampled  upon  the  laws  of  the  Re- 
public; that  he  has  been  guilty  of  treason  to  the  constitution;  that 
he  is  not  the  legitimate  President,  but  a  usurper  of  the  public  power ; 
and  that  his  government  perturbs  and  dishonors  Central  America." 
By  the  same  reasoning  Madriz's  title  was  also  invalid,  because 
he  was  never  elected,  and  his  only  claim  to  office  was  based  on  the 
action  of  his  predecessor  in  "  depositing  the  power  "  in  him.  Fur- 
thermore, he  was  clearly  ineligible  to  receive  the  "  deposit "  because 
he  was  not  a  member  of  the  national  assembly,  as  required  by  the 
constitution  then  in  force;  he  was  not  the  Vice  President,  nor  a 
cabinet  minister,  and,  in  fact,  had  not  lived  in  Nicaragua  for  14 
years.  Zelaya  just  willed  the  office  to  him  like  personal  property. 

His  title  wTas  defective  de  facto  as  wTell  as  de  jure.  He  never 
showed  the  slightest  possibility  of  putting  down  the  revolution  or 
causing  his  authority  to  be  obeyed.  He  surrounded  himself  with  the 
same  corrupt  leaders  and  indulged  the  same  cruel  practices  as 
Zelaya,  with  the  result  that  he  forfeited  whatever  good  will  the 
people  might  have  felt  for  having  been  freed  from  tyranny;  and 
the  revolution  which  at  first  was  confined  to  the  Atlantic  coast  spread 
across  the  country,  and  after  overcoming  the  almost  insuperable 
obstacles  of  mountains  and  swamps,  reached  the  capital.  To  excuse 
his  failure  to  check  it,  Madriz  charged  that  American  Navy  officers 
had  interfered  with  his  military  operations.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
they  had  only  taken  the  customary  step  of  prohibiting  bombard- 
ment or  fighting  by  either  faction  within  the  unfortified  and  un- 
garrisoned  commercial  city  of  Bluefields,  thus  protecting  the  pre- 
ponderating American  and  other  foreign  interests,  just  as  the  com- 
mander of  the  British  cruiser  had  done  a  few  days  previously  at 
Grey  town  where  there  were  large  British  interests.  In  the  Grey  town 
case  it  happened  that  the  action  taken  favored  the  Madriz  forces, 
while  at  Bluefields  the  result  was  quite  the  opposite;  but  the  real 
test  of  strength  between  the  two  factions  took  place  inland,  far  re- 
moved from  both  the  British  and  American  naval  vessels,  and  there 
Madriz  was  overwhelmed  by  force  of  arms  and  fled  from  the  country. 
The  new  leaders  established  their  authority  and  suppressed  all  or- 
ganized resistance  without  having  (at  any  time  received  de  lacto 
recognition  from  the  United  States.  Formal  diplomatic  relations 
between  the  Washington  and  Managua  Governments  were  not  re- 
stored until  after  the  people  of  Nicaragua  had  passed  on  the  merits 
of  the  revolution  bv  holding  a  general  election. 

The  third  criticism  is  that  the  "  conservative "  government  of 
Estrada-Diaz,  which  followed  the  "liberal"  regime  of  Zelaya- 
Madriz,  was  corrupt  and  despotic,  and  the  program  of  American 
financial  reorganization  which  it  adopted  worked  great  injustice  to 
Nicaragua. 

The  words  "conservative"  and  "liberal"  have  no  meaning  and 
give  a  totally  erroneous  impression,  for  not  all  the  solidity  and 
wisdom  of  the  country  are  found  in  the  group  which  bears  one 
label,  nor  all  the  turbulence  and  corruption  in  the  other;  and,  in- 
versely, not  all  the  narrowness  and  fanaticism  are  in  the  first,  nor 
all  the  progress  and  honesty  in  the  second.  There  is  a  mixture  of 
,  good  and  bad  in  both,  but  neither  deserves  to  be  called  a  political 
/  party.  Nicaraguan  politics  are  difficult  to  grasp,  for  the  reason  that 
there  are  no  parties  in  the  American  sense  of  the  word,  and  that  the 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  15 

people,  instead  of  being  aligned  in  two  groups  known  as  conserva- 
tives and  liberals,  are  divided  into  many  small  factions,  the  number    I 
and  size  depending  on  the  influence  and  ambition  of  petty  leaders  or  \y 
the  vengefulness  of  disappointed  office  seekers. 

To  understand  the  complete  absence  of  political  issues  or  principles 
it  is  sufficient  to  recall  a  few  recent  incidents.  When  the  "  conserva- 
tive "  government  came  into  power  after  the  flight  of  Madriz,  it  was 
made  up  of  President  Estrada,  the  leader  of  the  revolution,  who  was 
a  liberal,  and  a  cabinet  composed  of  Moncada.  also  a  liberal,  Diaz, 
Chamorro,  and  Mena,  conservatives.  The  title  of  president  was 
merely  nominal,  for  all  real  power  was  exercised  by  Mena,  who  was 
in  control  of  the  army,  as  minister  of  war.  The  latter  with  the  aid 
of  certain  conservatives  ousted  Estrada,  the  liberal  president,  by 
forcing  his  resignation  and  exile  from  the  country;  when  Diaz,  the 
conservative,  succeeded  to  the  presidency,  a  coup'  d'etat  against  his 
government  was  attempted  by  Mena.  a  conservative,  with  the  sup- 
port of  the  liberals.  In  such  a  mess  it  is  idle  to  try  to  discover  any 
distinction  between  liberals  and  conservatives,  and  when  the  terms 
are  used  hereinafter  they  are  to  be  understood  as  having  only  an 
approximate  meaning. 

The  charge  of  corruption  made  against  the  Estrada-Diaz  adminis- 
tration is  based  on  the  issue  of  some  millions  of  paper  money  and  the 
payment  of  large  sums  in  the  guise  of  claims  to  various  members  of 
the  faction  in  power. 

It  is  unfortunately  true  that  there  were  great  issues  of  paper  money. 
This  is  an  evil  practice  which  exists  not  only  in  Central  America  but 
also  in  Mexico.  During  Estrada's  administration  about  24,000,000 
pesos  were  forced  into  circulation  as  compared  to  32,000,000  issued 
by  Zelaya  and  Madriz.  There  is  this  difference  to  be  noted,  that 
President  Diaz  reformed  the  monetary  conditions  in  Nicaragua  by 
retiring  the  depreciated  bills  and  placing  the  new  currency  on  a  gold 
exchange  basis,  which  is  guaranteed  by  the  maintenance  of  an  ample 
gold  reserve  fund. 

It  is  very  likely  true  that  large  sums  were  paid  to  prominent  mem- 
bers of  the  Government,  but  as  they  were  for  the  most  part  persons 
who  had  been  compelled  to  submit  to  "  forced  loans,"  exacted  by 
Madriz  and  Zelaya,  there  is  something  to  be  said  on  their  side  of  the 
case  as  to  the  justice  of  their  claims  for  reimbusement,  even  if  not  for 
the  method  of  their  payment,  against  which  the  department  protested. 
In  further  understanding  of  these  matters  it  ought  to  be  remembered 
that  all  during  the  time  of  the  corrupt  or  irregular  practices,  Mena 
was  in  control  of  the  treasury  department,  and  it  was  because  of  the 
effort  to  eliminate  him  from  the  cabinet  and  thereby  suppress  the 
evil,  that  both  Estrada  and  Diaz,  in  turn,  met  with  misfortune, 
Estrada  being  obliged  to  resign  the  presidency,  and  Diaz  forced  to 
contend  with  an  insurrection.  In  other  words,  the  same  element  in 
Nicaragua,  which  is  now  making  the  loudest  complaint,  is  the  one 
which  supported  Mena,  who  was  responsible  for  the  dishonest  prac- 
tices. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  added  that  it  was  for  the  very  purpose 
of  preventing  the  payment  of  any  exorbitant  or  unjust  demands  that 
the  Estrada  government  favored  the  program  of  control  of  finances 
by  the  United  States,  and  the  appointment  of  a  mixed  claims  com- 
mission, composed  of  two  American  judges  and  one  Nicaraguan,  to 


16  AMERICAN    POLICY     IN     NICARA<;rA. 

pass  on  domestic  as  well  as  foreign  claims  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Knox-Castrillo  loan  convention  which  failed  of  approval  by  the 
Senate. 

The  importance  of  this  claims  commission  has  never  been  fully 
understood,  because  the  principal  functions  contemplated  for  the 
commissioners  were  never  put  into  operation  on  account  of  the  ab- 
sence of  treaty  sanction.  It  was  an  entirely  new  idea  in  our  diplo- 
macy and  was  intended  to  supply  a  deficiency  which  has  long  been 
recognized,  namely,  that  there  is  no  machinery,  in  the  Department 
of  State  for  determining  the  validity  or  for  apportioning  equitably 
the  extent  and  nature  of  claims  which  our  Government  is  frequently 
called  upon  to  urge  against  certain  Latin-American  countries,  and  as 
their  courts  are  often  mere  tools  in  the  hands  of  a  dictator  neither 
our  own  nor  foreign  Governments  are  willing  to  submit  to  such 
decisions  as  final.  It  was  to  meet  this  need  for  a  competent  and 
impartial  tribunal  that  the  claims  commission  was  organized.  It  is 
not  to  be  confused  with  the  ordinary  mixed-claims  commission,  be- 
cause, although  its  members  are  of  two  different  nationalities — 
American  and  Nicaraguan — yet  it  is  not  an  international  but  a 
national  court,  appointed  by  and  under  the  laws  of  Nicaragua. 

The  British  and  German  Governments  declined  to  recognize  it  or 
to"  submit  their  claims  to  its  jurisdiction,  and  there  was  no  way  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  on  £hem  to  change  their  attitude,  because  of 
failure  of  Senate  approval  of  the  loan  convention.  The  British 
Government  threatened  in  May,  1912,  that  it  would  force  payment  of 
its  claims  unless  Nicaragua  was  prepared  to  enter  into  a  treaty  con- 
ceding certain  fishery  rights,  which  were  objectionable  because  of 
territorial  privileges  carried  by  them.  Later  on  German  interests 
attempted  to  get  from  the  Nicaraguan  Government  a  concession  to 
canalize  the  San  Juan  River  and  to  navigate  the  river  and  lakes  in 
connection  with  a  scheme  for  the  colonization  and  exploitation  of 
certain  banana  plantations  in  Costa  Rica. 

Another  important  function  contemplated  for  the  commission  was 
the  examination  of  the  validity  of  all  the  contracts  or  concessions 
granted  by  preceding  administrations  in  Nicaragua  and  the  assess- 
ment of  damages  in  cases  of  cancellation,  amendment,  or  expropria- 
tion of  such  contracts.  Secretary  Knox  was  thus  putting  into  prac- 
tice the  idea  afterwards  so  earnestly  advocated  by  President  Wilson 
in  his  Mobile  speech,  in  which  he  declared  that  the  system  of  grant- 
ing "  concessions  "  was  responsible  for  "  a  condition  of  affairs  always 
dangerous  and  apt  to  become  intolerable  " ;  that  the  States  suffering 
from  them  are  in  need  of  "  emancipation  from  the  subordination," 
and  "  we  ought  to  be  the  first  in  assisting  them  in  that  emancipa- 
tion." 

The  fourth  criticism  is  that  the  landing  of  marines  at  Corinto  at 
the  time  of  the  Mena  insurrection  was  an  unprecedented  violation  of 
territory,  and  their  retention  in  Managua  is  the  only  thing  that 
prevents  the  downfall  of  the  Diaz  administration. 

It  is  a  well-establisherl  j^rinciple  of  international  law  that  any 
Government  has  the  ri^htlpland  and  use  for^esjoiTToreign  territory 
krT5rotect  its  own  nationals.  This  practice  has  been  phsprvpc]  nnt 
oniy-frvTne  United"States.l>iit  also  by  the  British,  French,  and~o!her 
European  Governments.  As  many  as  two  score  instances  may  be 
mentioned  ol  such  action  in  Latin  American  countries,  and  that  the 
precedent*will  continue  to  be  followed,  wl|en  circumstances  require, 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  17 

is  shown  by  the  recent  case  of  Haiti,  not  to  mention  Vera  Cruz, 

g-nishpd   in   thnt,  it,  w 
Government:  arid  in  this 


hmding  at  Corinto  may  be  further  rHsting-nishpd  in  thnt,  it,  was  at 
the^rprebij  ilUilal""'1rf  *h«  Ninnmgrnnn  Government;  aiftl  in  this 
respect  there  is  also  a  precedent,  for  in  1896  President  Cleveland 
disembarked  forces  at  the  same  port,  on  official  request  of  the  Zelaya 
Government,  by  note  of  February  25,  to  protect  property  and  to 
support  the  Government  against  revolutionists.  The  two  cases  have 
a  surprising  resemblance,  further  accentuated  by  the  circumstance 
(hat  President  Cleveland  also  directed,  through  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  that  the  marines  should  proceed  inland  to  Leon,  if  neces- 
sary and  expedient,  to  rescue  a  messenger  of  the  American  Legation 
who  was  reported  to  have  been  arrested  or  detained  by  the  revolu- 
tionists; and  by  the  further  circumstance  that  the  commanding  offi- 
cer served  a  notice  on  the  lawless  element  that  he  was  prepared  to 
prevent  by  force,  if  necessary,  pillaging  of  the  English  bank  at  Leon. 
Three  years  later  marines  were  again  disembarked  on  Zelaya's  re- 
quest at  Bluefields,  and  held  possession  of  the  port  for  some  time 
until  the  arr.^al  oihis  troops. 

Perhaps  a  possible  distinction  in  the  two  cases  of  landing  United 
States  Marines  at  Corinto  is  that  in  1896  it  was  British  property, 
principally,  that  was  to  be  protected,  while  in  1912  American  in- 
terests were  preponderant.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the 
"present  Nicaraguan  Government  had  been  firmly  established  in  power 
two  years  before  the  marines  arrived  to  protect  American  property 
against  Mena's  lawlessness;  it  had  long  since  driven  out  the  Madriz 
us«rpers,  overcome  all  armed  resistance  to  its  authority,  and  con- 
firmed its  right  to  exist  by  popular  elections.  The  Diaz  Government 
has  thus  shown  that  it  not  only  controls  sufficient  force  to  maintain 
itself  in  power,  but  also  that  it  rests  on  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the 
people. 

In  the  statement  that  if  the  marines  should  be  withdrawn  from 
MarTagua  the  Uiaz  actmmistratirn  woum  succumb  there  is  an  mH- 
matloh  that  the  presence-of  the  American  forces  is  against  the  wishes 
of  the  JNicaraguan  perple.     experience,  however,  has  shown  ~quite 
the  contrary.     Jj/ven  i^eon,  after  the  Mena  disturbance  was  sup~ 
pressed  and  the  city  returned  to  Government  control,  requestedand 
urged  that  the  marines  be  kept  there  in  preference  to  NicaraguaTf" 
troops,  jbecause  of  fear  of  reprisals  from  their  late  opponents! 
leading  Liberals  declared  to  pur  officers  that  they  hn 


confidence  in  the  AmerVnnQ  t.Vmn 


ClTmandega,  the  fourth  largest  town,  the  most  prominent  citizens, 
irrespective  of  party,  expressed^thfl  ~ 


officer  rule'  them_permanentlyT7  At  Granada  the  citizens  in  IIMISS 
meeting  jioTFpted  resolutions  of  thanks  nnrl  transmit.^  a  memorial 
to  Admiral  ISontherJ  and,  the  commanding  officer,  in  just  recognition 
of  his  remarkably  yueceyyful  handling  of  a  difficult  situation,  saying : 
Because  of  the  highly  marked  benefits  that  we  have  received  from  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Americans,  we  send  to  you  and  those  serving  under  you,  in  the 
name  of  this  community,  an  expression  of  our  sincere  gratitude,  asking  that 
you  present  these  sentiments  to  the  Government  of  your  generous  country,  and 
our  hope  and  desire  that  the  sacrifices  made  by  you  will  give  as  result  an 
established  and  enduring  peace  in  Nicaragua. 

A  pathetic  letter  was  sent  by  the  women  describing  the — 
state  of  horror  and  fright  in  which  mothers,  daughters,  wives,  and  sisters  saw 
themselves,  each  moment  threatened  with  the  loss  of  all  they  held  most  dear; 
S.  Doc.  334,  64-1 2 


18  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

*  *. .  *  we  celebrated  with  enthusiasm  your  arrival  ou  the  shores  of  Nica- 
ragua as  an  omen  that  soon  our  ills  would  cease.  Our  hopes  were  fulfilled, 
inasmuch  «s  you  have  given  with  wonderful  rapidity  the  peace  and  tranquillity 
that  we  so  much  longed  for. 

On  a  march  which  the  marines  made  through  the  country  and  over 
the  mountains  they  were  met  everywhere  by  reception  committees 
and  escorted  to  the  cities,  where  they  were  received  with  enthusiasm, 
most  notably  at  Matagalpa  and  Eivas.  That  yudi  friendly  teelmg 
prevailed  was  due  in  great  part  to  the  confidence  and  respect  aroused 
in  the  people  by  the  exemplary  conduct  of  the  marines  and  blue- 
jackets officered  by  men  of  such  tact,  firmness,  and  common  sense,  as 
shown,  for  example,  by  Maj.  Smedley  Butler,  whose  battalion,  being 
the  earliest  to  arrive  in  Nicaragua,  was  responsible  for  first  impres- 
sions. 

In  a  letter  of  appreciation  to  the  commanding  officer  November  10, 
1912,  the  American  manager  of  the  railroad  wrote  from  Managua : 

Speaking  of  the  interests  I  have  the  honor  to  represent,  their  property,  com- 
prising all  the  steamers  and  most  of  the  railway,  was  in.the  hands  of  bandits, 
vandals,  and  miscreants ;  our  very  lives  were  in  jeopardy,  and  our  confidence 
in  the  governing  powers  badly  shaken  when  your  opportune  arrival  brought 
order  out  of  chaos,  restored  jproperty  to  its  rightful  owners  anil  +r'a>.i™n  fn 
many  a  despairing  prisoner,  for  all  of  which  the  country  owes  to  you  a  debt  of 
gratitude  wmch  can  never  be  paid.  '  ~— *- 

A  like  sentiment  prevailed  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  The  Press,  of 
Bluefields,  in  an  article  of  October  13,  s'Sid  that  it — 
desires  to  express  in  the  name  of  the  foreign  colony  its  hearty  and  sincere  appro 
ciation  of  the  orderliness,  propriety,  and  universal  good  conduct  observed  by 
the  Takoma's  boys ;  and,  further,  to  assure  the  bluejackets  and  men  of  the 
Marine  Corps  that  their  fellow  countrymen  here  are  proud  of  them  and  consider 
them  a  credit  to  the  uniforms  they  wear. 

This  favorable  opinion  was  held  not  only  by  natives  and  foreigners 
alike  but  it  was  given  official  expression  in  a  note  to  the  American 
legation  from  the  foreign  office  and  in  a  special  act  of  the  National 
Assembly,  indorsing  what  had  been  done.  Infact,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  mass  of  the  Nicaraguan  people  welcome  any  iliflllelice  that 
gives  promise  ot  releasing  them  from  barbarous  persecution  and  of 
permitting  them  to  live  in  peace. — The  Only  complaint  against  the 
Americans  comes  irom  tha  dl^illlijfted  politicians, -th"e"~Zelayistas, 
and  thuye  who'liVfe  on  revolutions.  This  truth  has  been  testified  to 
agaliHind  again  by  naVal  officers  "who  have  visited  the  country.  Thus 
i Commander  Benson  of  the  Albany  reported  in  April,  1909,  during 
a  visit  at  Corinto  in  Zelaya's  time : 

There  is  a  bitter  and  contemptuous  feeling  of  the  governing  [Zelayista]  class 
toward  the  United  States,  but  the  general  mass  of  the  people  are  most  heartily 
in  «ympathy  with  the  United  States  and  its  policies.  The  country  is  prac- 
tically under  a  reign  of  terror;  everyone  seems  afraid  of  doing  or  saying 
anything  that  might  reach  the  President. 

The  Associated  Press  correspondent,  sent  to  Nicaragua  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Madriz  regime,  reported  in  the  dispatch  which 
was  published  on  January  27,  1910: 

I  expect  trouble  here  when  Madriz  arrives.  Leon  alone  is  for  him,  and 
the  garrisons  of  Managua  and  Granada  are  being  made  up  afresh  of  soldiers 
from  Leon.  *  *  *  There  is  no  genuine  hostility  toward  Americans  and  no 
chance  of  a  spontaneous  uprising  against)  them;  but  there  is  every  likelihood 
of  an  organized  uprising  of  armed  resistance  commanded  to  docile  soldiers  by 
politicians  bent  upon  diverting  public  indignation  from  themselves  and  resort- 
ing to  the  simple  trick  of  summoning  tUe  specter  of  foreign  invasion  and 
annexation  by  people  of  another  race,.-—/ 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  19 

Admiral  Kimball,  who  commanded  the  squadron  in  Nicaraguan 
waters  at  the  time  of  Zelaya's  flight,  reported  that  he  could  control 
the  situation  without  any  show  of  force.  The  reason  that  this 
would  be  possible,  he  added,  was  because  while  there  is  a  theory  that 
the  Nicaraguans  hate  and  detest  Americans  and  everything  Ameri- 
can, "  they  actually  have  a  childish  and  unquestioning  faith  in  the 
kindness,  helpfulness,  innate  fairness,  and  boundless  power  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  and  the  Government  that  represents 
them." 

If  then  the  Diaz  government  is  strong  enough  to  sustain  itself, 
and  there  is  no  unfriendly  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people  against  the  United  States,  the  question  may  quite  naturally 
be  asked  why  the  marines  are  retained  as  a  legation  guard. 

There  are  several  reasons  for  not  withdrawing  them  at  this  time. 
In  the  first  place  it  would  be  construed  as  an  invitation  to  resume 
disorders.  The  mass  of  the  people,  while  ordinarily  peaceably  in- 
clined, are  uneducated  and  easily  misled.  If  our  forces  were  re- 
moved, the  impression  would  be  created  that  the  United  States  had 
lost  confidence  in  President  Diaz  and  desired  his  elimination  from 
office.  A  similar  belief  as  to  Zelaya,  it  will  be  remembered,  caused 
his  flight  from  the  country,  with  hardly  a  struggle,  by  the  mere 
severance  of  diplomatic  relations. 

There  is  another  reason.  Jnsiirrpctions  in  Nicaragua,  as  elsewhere 
in  Central  America1  are  nothing  but  military  uprisings  and  not  POPp7 
Tar  movements  in  any  sense.  The  only  exception  to  this  rule  that 
"can  be  recalled  was  the  Jbiluefields  revolution  which  drove  out  the 
Zelaya-Madriz  regime,  and  which,  though  it  started  with  an  insig- 
nificant defection  of  troops  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  met  with  such 
popular  support  that  it  crossed  the  mountains,  spread  throughout 
the  country,  and  engulfed  all  three  cities  of  Managua,  Leon,  and 
Granada.  But  this  was  an  unusual  case.  The  trouble  ordinarily 
starts  with  the  mutiny  of  a  garrison  or  the  seizure  of  the  arsenal, 
sometimes  accompanied  by  the  capture  of  the  President,  To  guard 
against  these  perils,  two  alternative  practices  have  generally  been 
adopted:  Either  collect  all  the  war  munitions  and  a  majority  of 
forces  in  one  central  garrison,  or  else  distribute  them  in  the  three 
leading  cities  of  Managua,  Leon,  and  Granada.  The  first  method 
possesses  the  merit  of  limiting  the  danger  of  disloyalty  to  one  local- 
ity, but  it  has  the  corresponding  disadvantage  of  leaving  the  Gov- 
ernment without  means  of  defense  in  case  of  its  loss;  the  second 
gives  the  ruler  two  bases  of  defense  in  the  event  of  mishap  to 
the  third,  but  increases  the  hazard  of  treachery  threefold.  Now,  by 
retaining  the  marines  at  the  capital,  all  military  supplies  can  be 
concentrated  at  that  one  point  under  their  control  without  the  neces- 
sity of  having  any  army  at  all  except  for  police  purposes,  as  in 
Panama.  Therefore  the  presence  of  only  a  few  marines  serves  a 
purpose  in  guarding  against  disorders  which  would  otherwise  re- 
quire the  maintenance.by  Nicaragua  of  several  thousand  troops,  and 
the  restoration  of  the  objectionable  system  of  militarism;  at  the  same 
time  their  presence  exercises  a  strong  moral  influence  in  preventing 
abuses  and  reprisals  by  subordinate  Government  authorities.  Under 
present  conditions_J:he  Government  can  devote  itself  to  working  out 
its  numerous  economic  problems  and  to  encouraging  peaceful  pur-  / 


20  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

suits  without  the  constant,  anxiety  of  preparing  against  the  attacks 
of  malcontent  politicians  or  against  treachery  by  ambitious  generals, 
Jike  Mena,  unable  to  resist  the  temptation  of  using  for  selfish  pur- 
poses  the  power  confided  to  them. 

Fossibly  the  most  important  reason  of  all  is  that  if  disorders  break 
out  again  in  Nicaragua  they  will  undoubtedly  spread  to  Honduras 
andjjuatemaia.  it  is  better  to  keep  a  tew  marines  where  they  are, 
especially  during  the  continuance  ot  uncertainty  111  Mexico,  rather 
tliaiTto  run  thcTrisk  of  having  a  condition  01  turbulence  in  ail  the 
region  trom  tHe~Kio  Grande  to  tne  Oanal  Zone. 


It  it  be  asked  how  long  the  mal'iliey  lire  to  be  continued  in  Man- 

;il  some  equally  goojj  ari 
that  will  assure  the  maintenance  of  peace^One  such  arrangement, 


agua,  the  answer  is,  until  some  equally  goo£  arrangement  is  made 


of  course,  is  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  thaf*tvill  leave  no  doubt  that 
the  United  States  discountenances  military  conspiracies  and  favors 
constitutional  orderj  There  has  been  no  war  or  revolution  in  Panama 
since  the  signing  of  the  canal  treaty  with  that  Republic,  and  Panama 
has  been  able  to  disband  its  army  and  save  the  expense  of  a  military 
establishment.  Furthermore,  there  has  been  no  necessity  for  using 
the  American  forces  on  the  Isthmus.  The  belief  that  they  would  be 
used  to  preserve  order  if  occasion  required  has  been  sufficient. 

1  he  fifth  criticism  is  that  the  Liberals  are  in  an  overwhelming 
majority  and  would  win  the  presidency  if  guaranteed  free,  honest 
elections,  under  the  supervision  of  the  United  States. 

Whether  their  claim  of  supremacy  and  their  proposal  for  testing 
it  are  sincere  or  not  may  be  judged  by  the  attitude  assumed  by  them 
when  in  control  of  the  Government  during  the  Zelaya-Madriz  regime. 

After  Madriz  had  been  engaged  for  three  months  in  a  futile  and 
bloody  attempt  to  suppress  the  Bluefields  revolution,  during  which 
more  lives  were  lost  than  in  any  equal  period  of  a  similar  disturbance, 
Estrada,  the  leader  of  the  revolution,  having  demonstrated  by  force 
of  arms  the  power  of  his  following,  made  an  offer  on  March  3,  1910. 
in  which  he  proposed  that  the  United  States  should  be  invited  to 
mediate,  and  to  supervise  elections  for  the  choosing  of  a  President 
and  Vice  President  of  the  Republic.  Madriz  responded  that  he  was 
the  legitimate  successor  of  Zelaya,  and  that  patriotism  prevented  him 
from  admitting  a  foreign  nation  to  act  as  intermediary  in  internal 
conflicts.  Four  months  later,  when  the  victorious  revolutionists  had 
arrived  at  the  gates  of  the  capital,  he  changed  his  mind,  and  appealed 
to  the  department  to  interpose  on  behalf  of  peace,  expressing  his 
willingness  "  to  follow  every  indication  which  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  may  be  pleased  to  make,"  and  when  it  was  too  late 
he  requested  mediation  by  the  foreign  consular  corps  in  order  that  he 
might  make  a  dignified  and  safe  exit  from  the  country. 

During  the  18  years  of  liberal  government  under  Gen.  Jose  Santos 
Zelaya  and  Dr.  Madriz,  not  even  the  form  of  an  election  was  gone 
through  with,  unless  an  exception  may  be  made  of  the  occasion  when 
three  candidates,  Jose,  Santos,  and  Zelaya,  were  put  up  and  were 
voted  for — a  cynical  bit  of  humor  on  the  part  o*f  the  dictator. 


AMEEICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  21 

party  has  a  majority.;  there  is  no  political  cohesiveness  whatsoever. 
VVhen  one  1  action  is  m^rffreef-ttre'^tner  factions  form  a.  sort _of_ tempo- 
rary combination  to  overturn  the  administration,  and  in  the  confusion 
which  follows  each  leader  seizes  what  he  can.  When  Zelaya  was"  in 
power,  a  faction  of  so-called  liberals  attempted  to  throw  him  out  by 
the  revolution  of  1896;  then  when  Madriz  succeeded  him,  other  lib- 
erals constantly  intrigued  for  their  own  advancement  and  against  the 
administration,  as  shown  by  the  records  of  our  legation  in  Managua. 
Again  when  Mena  attempted  his  revolution  against  the  present 
Nicaraguan  Government,  he  was  pledged  the  support  of  the  liberals, 
but  as  soon  as  there  was  a  bare  prospect  of  success  three  or  four 
*'  presidents  "  were  proclaimed  in  different  parts  of  the  Republic. 

Admiral  Kimball  made  a  very  interesting  report  December  31, 1909, 
of  the  visit  he  paid  Madriz  at  the  executive  mansion,  in  Managua. 
Madriz  explained  why  he  had  accepted  the  presidency  from  Zelaya, 
whom  he  had  denounced  as  a  usurper,  and  from  a  Congress  which  he 
had  proved  to  be  illegal,  on  the  ground  that  he  thought  this  was  the 
best  way  to  avoid  bloodshed ;  he  was  disappointed  in  that  he  had  ex- 
pected the  best  men  of  Nicaragua  to  come  to  his  aid,  but  so  far  only 
»  few  personal  friends  and  a  horde  of  self-interested  people  had  ap- 
proached him;  discussing  elections,  he  .called  attention  to  the  fact 
that— 

there  is  at  present  absolutely  no  registration  upon  which  to  hold  an  election, 
that  practically  a  generation  has  passed  away  and  a  new  one  had  come  up  since 
elections  were  abolished  by  /daya  ;  that  he  would  endeavor  to  establish  a  satis- 
factory registration  of  voters,  and  an  election  that  would  be  respected ;  that 
of  course  laborers  on  the  coffee  fincas  and  plantations  would  vote  much  as  their 
patrons  desired,  but  this  was  also  the  case  during  the  30  years  of  peace. 

The  admiral,  who  had  formed  a  friendly  attachment  for  Madriz, 
continues: 

I  asked  him  who.  in  bis  opinion,  would  be  elected  if  such  an  election  as  he  had 
outlined  could  be  held.  He  said  that  Juan  Estrada  or  Espino/a  would  probably 
be  successful  since  their  revolt  against  Zelaya  would  give  them  prestige ;  possibly 
a  man  of  his  (Madri/.)  faction  of  the  liberal  party  might  succeed,  and  that 
there  was  nothing  impossible  in  supposing  that  a  nominee  of  the  conservatives 
might  develop  sufficient  strength. 

That  Madriz's  estimate  of  the  possible  strength  of  Estrada  was  cor- 
rect, was  shown  by  the  elections  held  in  1910  after  the  restoration  of 
order,  when  the  ticket  composed  of  Juan  Estrada,  a  liberal,  for  presi- 
dent, and  Adolfo  Diaz,  a  conservative,  for  vice  president,  both  leaders 
of  the  the  Bluefields  movement,  received  a  major'ty  of  the  votes. 
Two  years  later,  in  November,  1912,  at  a  direct  popular  election  Diaz 
for  president  and  Solorzano  for  vice  president,  were  the  successful 
nominees.  Thus  the  candidacy  of  Diaz  was  passed  upon  twice  with- 
in a  very  short  period.  His  tenure  in  that  respect  will  compare  very 
favorably  with  that  of  the  other  presidents  of  Central  America ;  and 
it  is  hard  therefore  to  understand  why  there  should  be  any  necessity 
for  an  American  supervision  of  the  election  in  Nicaragua  and  not  in 
the  other  Republics. 

The  Department  of  State,  however,  did  consider  the  question  of 
such  a  supervision  in  1912  and  inquired  the  views  of  its  legation  on 
the  subject.  In  his  reply  the  American  minister  said : 

I  think  that  the  general  public  in  Nicaragua  understand  that  the  policy  of 
the  United  States  is  not  hostile  to  the  liberal  party  as  such  nor  to  the  con- 
servative party,  but  is  directed  against  the  corruptionists,  the  intriguers,  and 


22  AMERICAN    POLICY    IX    NICARAGUA. 

criminals  of  all  parties,  be  they  conservatives  like  Mena  or  liberals  like  Ze- 
laya  *  *  *.  The  ban  should  include  also  professional  revolutionists.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  there  is  not  a  single  general  on  either  government  or  rebel 
side  who  has  not  designs  on  the  presidency.  *  '  !  It  seems  inadvisable  to 
raise  the  question  of  elections  until  the  army  *  *  *  has  been  disbanded.  rt_ 
would  be  unwise  for  the  United  States  to  supervise  elect  ion  sj,  the  Panama 
precedent  Is  hardly  applicable  (because  the  right  of  the  united  States  to  inter- 
fere in  that  country  is  recognized  by  treaty  and  by  the  constitution  of  the  Re- 
public, notwithstanding  which,  the  defeated  party  charged  fraud).  There  has 
•never  been  a  registration  of  voters  in  Nicaragua •  If  _  we  undertook  the  work 
W£  should  have  To"  do  it  thoroughly,  and  this  wouUfrequire  more  nine  and  men 
tlTan  we  have  availaEC^  Neither  party  would  willingly  acquiesce  in  an  adverse 
result,  however  fairTand  we  should  have  to  bear  the  burden  of  criticism  with- 
out the  power  to  justify  our  course  by  assuring  the  honesty  of  the  administra- 
tion after  it  enters  office.  The  fact  is  the  cry  of  fair  elections  just  now  is  not 
sincere.  The  majority  of  the  people  are  satisfied  with  President  Diaz,  and 
the  malcontents  are  more  desirous  of  securing  the  presidency  than  of  having 
honest  elections.  The  Mena  rebellion,  which  was  supported  by  the  Zelayistas, 
affords  conclusive  proof  of  this  assertion.  -Mena  never  questioned  the  validity 
of  Diaz's  title  to  office,  and  he  never  even  pretended  that  he  himself  was  the 
popular  choice.  On  the  contrary,  he  denied  the  right  and  the  capacity  of  the 
people  to  hold  an  election.  Diaz  stood  for  the  principle  of  direct  popular  elec- 
tions; Mena  opposed  that  principle  and  yet  the  liberals  supported  Mena.  Of 
course,  the  purpose  was  to  create  strife  among  the  members  of  the  adminis- 
tration, and  in  the  confusion  seize  the  power,  thus  eliminating  both  Diaz  and 
Mena.  There  is  a  small  coterie  in  the  two  parties  which  feels  each  against  the 
other  the  bitter  hostility  inherited  from  Spanish  colonial  days  to  such  an  ex- 
treme that  they  would  both  prefer  to  have  the  United  States  govern  the  country 
rather  than  see  the  opposing  faction  in  office.  This  feeling  is  one  source  of 
Diaz's  strength.  Almost  every  military  leader  who  is  unable  to  conquer  the 
country  for  himself  prefers  Diaz  or  some  equally  peaceful  civilian  to  any  rival 
general.  Many  prominent  government  officials  and  a  great  number  of  influ- 
ential liberals  have  privately  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  only  hope  for  pence 
in  Nicaragua  is  to  be  found  in  government  of  the  country  by  the  United  States. 
My  own  opinion  is  that  this  is  not  at  all  necessary  and  that  on  the  contrary 
we  should  not  interfere  in  local  affairs  at  all  except  in  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  insure  order  and  protection  to  life  and  property.  The  matters  cov- 
ered by  this  exception  could  most  probably  hereafter  be  controlled  as  in 
Panama  by  moral  influence. 

The  last  election  held  in  Nicaragua  produced  some  interesting  results. 
Diaz  was  nominated  for  the  presidency  by  the  conservatives,  and  Gen. 
Chamorro,  generously  waiving  his  own  candidacy  in  a  commendable 
spirit  of  harmony,  pledged  himself  to  support  that  nomination,  and 
honorably  lived  up  to  his  pledge,  but  many  of  Chamorro's  followers 
proved  recalcitrant  and  insisted  on  voting  for  him,  with  the  result 
that  although  not  elected,  nevertheless  he  carried  the  city  of  Granada. 
This  fact  has  its  interest  because  it  tends  to  show  that  if  the  people  of 
any  district  really  favor  a  candidate  they  can  carry  the  election  for 
him,  notwithstanding  the  administration's  control  of  the  machinery, 
recognition  of  which  circumstance  probably  influenced  Zelaya  and 
Madriz  in  refusing  to  call  elections  when  thev  were  in  power.  The 
liberals  did  not  put  up  any  candidate  against  Diaz,  either  because  they 
could  not  agree  upon  one  or  else  they  preferred  to  let  the  contest  go  by 
default  and  then  attempt  to  oust  him  by  raising  the  cry  for  new  and 
fair  elections.  But  many  of  them  fearing  that  Chamorro  might  defeat 
Diaz  voted  for  the  latter.  A  final  canvass  of  the  ballots  showed  that  for 
president  Diaz  received  23.467,  Chamorro,  2,229 ;  and  Baca,  34 ;  for  vice 
president  Solorzano,  25.667;  Espinoza,  32;  and  scattering  votes  for 
Gen.  Saenz  and  Manuel  Lacayo.  If  these  figures  may  be  taken  as  true, 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  the  contrary,  they  seem  to  indicate 
that  the  vote  of  the  whole  country  in  a  contested  campaign  would  be 
almost  equally  divided  between  the  so-called  conservatives  and 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 


23 


liberals.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  combined  vote  of  Diaz  and 
Chamorro  is  26,000,  not  counting  conservatives  who  did  not  go  to  the 
polls.  There  has  never  been  an  accurate  census  of  the  Republic,  but 
the  population  is  generally  estimated  at  500,000,  and  allowing  one- 
eighth  as  the  proportion  of  male  voters  would  give  slightly  over 
60.000,  indicating  how  evenly  divided  are  the  two  parties.  It  is 
doubtful,  however,  if  any  Liberal  leader  could  poll  the  full  strength 
of  his  party  because  of  the  many  factional  fights  in  Leon  and  else- 
where, and  the  absence-of  any  real  party  principles  or  political  issues. 


For  similar  reasons  it  is  equally  difficult  to  determine  in  advance  the 
vote-getting  ability  of  any  Conservative  candidate. 

The  sixth  criticism  is  that  the  Liberals  are  at  least  entitled  to  share 
in  a  coalition  government  and  obtain  half  the  patronage. 


This  proposal  sounds  suspiciously  like  the  one  they  made  in  1893, 
when  President  Sacasa  was  in  power,  and  which  resulted  in  an  agree- 
ment signed  on  May  31  of  that  year  at  Sabana  Grande,  whereby  it 
was  provided  that  Machado  should  become  President  and  select  his 
cabinet  from  among  the  members  of  the  two  parties.  The  written 
document  contained  this  binding  clause,  signed  by  the  American 
diplomatic  representative: 

The  minister  of  the  United  States  interposes  in  the  agreement  his  official 
mediation  and  his  moral  guaranty  for  the  good  faith  and  the  compliance  by 
both  sides. 

Within  six  weeks  therefrom,  or,  to  be  exact,  on  July  11,  the  Liberals 
at  Leon  seized  President  Machado,  who  had  been  invited  to  pay  a 
visit  there,  and  during  the  confusion  which  resulted  from  his  im- 
prisonment, Zelaya  with  a  small  force  marched  on  Managua,  and 
after  barbarously  bombarding  the  unfortified  capital^  against  the 
vigorous  protest  of  the  American  minister,  who  had  signed  the 
Sabana  Grande  agreement,  proclaimed  himself  President — and  was 
duly  recognized.  Zelaya  began  his  regime  by  defying  the  United 
States  and  ended  by  murdering  two  of  its  citizens. 

The  coalition  government "  of  Machado  did  not  last  two  months. 
Hardly 'any  better  success  has  been  obtained  by  the  more  recent 
efforts  at  this  sort  of  compromise.  As  soon  as  a  member  of  an  op- 

?e  in  the  admimstratiSTrtn 
Government  inn 


posing  fnctinn 


at  once  beginsto  use  it  to  ovt 
of  himself  anTTTiis 


important 
w 


e* 
interest 


faction. 
t  of  con 


Mena  is  the  most  recent  example  of  the 

futility  of  this  sort  of  compromise.  In  the  present  uncertainty  in 
Central  America  it  would  be  especially  dangerous  to  give  a  cabinet 
appointment  in  Nicaragua  to  any  of  the  Zelaya  faction  because  he 
would  use  his  office  to  aid  or  incite  revolution  in  Honduras  and 
Guatemala.  A  divisional  power*  jnNicaragua,  as  elsewhere,  means 
lack  of  efficiency,  a  bseiiceof  responsibility,  and  niter  confusion.^ 
— 1'he  seventh  criticism  is  that  the  pending  canal  treaty  is  object  ion  - 
able  not  only  because  it  is  unpopular  in  Nicaragua,  but  also  that  it 
violates  the  rights  of  the  other  Central  American  States. 

When  the  treaty  was  being  negotiated  it  came  up  for  general 
discussion  in  Nicaragua,  and  was  debated  both  in  the  National  As- 
sembly and  by  private  individuals.  Many  of  the  leading  citizens 
favored  the  inclusion  of  stipulations  in  the  nature  of  a  Platt  amend- 
ment, but  it  was  thought  by  the  legation  that  such  an  amendment 
might  lessen  the  chances  of  approval  by  the  United  States  Senate, 
so  it  was  dropped.  A  "junta  de  notables,"  or  conference  of  promi- 
nent men,  was  called  and  urged  the  prompt  passage  of  the  measure. 


24  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

The  assembly  considered  the  treaty  at  length,  made  a  slight  change 
which  was  accepted  by  the  department,  and  then  voted  approval 
by  more  than  the  necessary  majority.  Nor  was  their  action  without 
precedent,  for  Nicaragua  has  entered  into  innumerable  contracts 
and  treaties,  such  as  those  signed  by  Ministers  Squier  and  Rise, 
and  Secretaries  Cass,  Dickinson,  and  Frelinghuysen,  relating  to 
the  construction  of  a  proposed  canal  and  to  the  navigation  of  the 
San  Juan  River  as  a  part  thereof.  Zelaya  and  the  present  complain- 
ing liberals  negotiated  several  such  agreements,  principally  with 
Europeans,  among  which  may  be  mentioned  a  contract  of  June  5, 
1897,  with  the  Atlas  Steamship  Co.,  a  British  corporation,  for  the 
exclusive  navigation  of  the  San  Juan  River  and  Lake  Nicaragua; 
and  another  of  October  27,  1898,  conceding  a  canal  option  to  the 
Grace-Cragin  Syndicate,  in  consideration  of  the  payment  of  $100,000 
cash  and  $400,000  on  time.  Remonstrance  against  this  speculative 
concession  was  made  without  avail  by  the  Department  of  State,  but 
fortunately  the  contract  lapsed  on  account  of  failure  to  meet  the  later 
installments. 

The  canal  treaty  signed  at  Mangua  is  reasonably  generous  to  the 
interests  of  Nicaragua.  It  provides  for  the  payment  of  $3,000,000  in 
trust,  to  be  used  for  purposes  of  general  education,  public  works,  and 
for  the  welfare  of  the  country.  It  was  at  the  suggestion  of  President 
Diaz  himself  that  the  clause  was  inserted  that  no  disbursements  should 
be  made  except  with  the  consent  of  the  secretary  of  state,  thus  doing 
away  with  any  opportunity  for  a  dishonest  or  improvident  use  of 
the  funds. 

If  this  convention  has  caused  any  dissatisfaction  in  the  other 
States  of  Central  America,  it  must  be  due  to  a  misunderstanding  of 
its  terms.  The  text  of  the  treaty,  that  is  to  say,  in  its  original  form, 
has  never  been  made  public,  and  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  understand 
on  what  grounds  objection  has  been  raised.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
treaty,  so  far  as  the  canal  feature  is  concerned,  concedes  merely  an 
option  and  not  the  title  to  a  canal  strip  as  in  Panama,  the  idea  being 
that  when  the  actual  construction  becomes  necessary  a  new  contract 
will  be  negotiated,  but  that  in  the  meanwhile,  if  the  treaty  is  ratified, 
the  whole  canal  agitation  will  cease  because  of  the  exclusive  option 
given  to  the  United  States.  When  a  new  contract  for  actual  con- 
struction is  to  be  negotiated  it  will  then  be  time  enough  to  consider 
any  rights  or  interests  of  the  neighboring  States ;  and  it  will  then,  but 
not  before,  become  necessary  for  Nicaragua,  according  to  the  terms 
of  a  convention  now  in  force,  to  consult  with  Costa  Rica,  that  country 
being  interested  because  its  territory  is  partly  bounded  by  the  San 
Juan  River,  which  would  most  likely  become  a  link  in  the  canal 
system  when  built. 

^Speaking  historically,  it  is  a  grave  error  to  assume  that  the  other 
States  in  -Central  America  are  opposed  to  the  construction  of  a 
canal  across  Nicaragua  by  the  United  States.  They  have  frequently 
expressed  their  approval  of  such  a  policy,  most  notably  at  the  time 
the  United  States  was  engaged  in  the  negotiations  which  eventually 
resulted  in  the  Frelinghuysen-Zavala  treaty.  In  the  early  part  of 
1883  Mr.  Hall,  the  American  minister  to  Central  America,  then  re- 
siding in  Guatemala,  was  instructed  to  sound  out  the  five  Govern- 
ments to  which  he  was  accredited.  On  May  4  he  reported  the  result 
of  a  visit  to  Salvador,  where  the  President,  the  minister  of  foreign 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  25 

affairs,  and  other  prominent  men  expressed  the  hope  that  the  canal 
would  be  constructed  across  the  territoiy  of  Nicaragua  and  owned 
and  operated  by  the  United  States.  In  an  official  note  the  foreign 
office  confirmed  this  understanding,  calling  especial  attention  to  the 
importance  of  the  project  to  Salvador,  because  of  it  being  the  only 
country  in  Central  America  without  a  port  on  the  Atlantic  coast, 
and  therefore  deprived  of  the  advantages  of  direct  communication 
with  the  eastern  section  of  the  United  States.  Not  contenting  itself 
with  these  cordial  and  earnest  expressions  (for  which  no  compensa- 
tion was  asked  in  those  days),  Salvador  displayed  great  activity 
writh  the  other  Republics  in  bringing  influence  to  bear  on  Nicaragua 
for  the  signing  of  .such  a  treaty  with  the  United  States,  and  Presi- 
dent Zaldivar  visited  Managua  to  use  his  personal  influence  in  that 
behalf.  The  Horiduran  and  Guatemalan  foreign  ministers,  acting 
for  their  respective  Governments,  likewise  sent  official  notes  indors- 
ing the  project  most  enthusiastically.  The  Costa  Rican  Government 
went  even  further  and  addressed  a  note  to  Secretary  Frelinghuysen 
appealing  to  the  United  States  in  favor  of  the  Nicaraguan  canal  on 
the  ground  of  American  fraternity  and  joint  interests. 

If  any  of  the  present  political  leaders  in  these  republics  are  opposing 
the  pending  treaty  because  of  the  cession  of  territory  for  naval  pur- 
poses in  Fonseca  Bay,  they  are  certainly  flying  in  the  face  of  precedent 
in  their  own  countries.  Each  and  all  of  the  States  of  Central  America 
have  at  one  time  or  another  offered  to  make  similar  grants  of  land 
to  the  United  States.  In  May,  1881,  Guatemala  proposed  to  cede 
Ocos  Bay  for  a  coaling  station;  in- December,  1901,  Costa  Rica  en- 
tered into  similar  negotiations  for  a  lease  of  200  years  of  Port  Elena, 
and  in  April,  1906,  offered  to  sell  Cocos  Island  for  a  naval  or  wireless 
station;  on  September  28,  1849,  a  treaty  was  signed  with  Honduras 
by  Mr.  Squier,  the  American  minister,  granting  to  the  United  States 
valuable  stretches  of  land  for  naval  stations  on  Tigre  Island,  also 
known  as  Amapala.  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  and  for  fortifications 
along  the  shore  of  the  bay;  again,  in  September,  1885,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Honduras  made  a  formal  proposal  to  grant  to  the  United 
States  the  right  to  establish  and  maintain  coaling  and  naval  stations 
on  both  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  coasts,  namely,  in  the  Bay 
Islands  and  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  the  purpose  being  "  that  the  pres- 
ence on  its  coast  of  vessels  of  the  United  States  would  favor  the  in- 
terests of  both  countries  and  would  create  new  ties  of  friendship." 

Salvador  has  no  coast  on  the  Atlantic  side,  and  though  having  a 
frontage  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  possesses  little  territory  of  strategic 
value.  The  people,  however,  have  always  been  extremely  friendly 
to  the  United  States,  and  at  the  time,  when  they  were  more  united 
in  political  sentiment  than  ever  before  or  since,  they  appealed  to  the 
United  States  for  annexation,  and  sent  two  commissioners  to  Wash- 
ington to  urge  their  petition.  --v 

The  eighth  criticism  is  that  the  pending  canal  treaty  is  further 
objectionable  because  it  will  prevent  a  union  of  Central  America. 

When  the  colonies  proclaimed  their  independence  of  Spain  and 
severed  the  bonds  that  united  them  to  the  mother  country,  there 
arose  a  strong  popular  sentiment  that  they  should  emulate  the  ex- 
ample of  the  United  States  and  organize  themselves  into  a  single, 
vigorous  Republic,  that  would  be  able  to  withstand  foreign  aggres- 
sion and  to  win  for  itself  a  position  in  the  family  of  nations.  Ac- 


26  AMEEICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

cordingly  in  1823  a  federation  was  established  with  its  capital  at 
Guatemala  City,  but  almost  immediately  dissensions  broke  out,  sev- 
eral of  the  States  seceded,  the  union  came  to  an  end,  and  its  president, 
Morazan,  was  executed  in  1842.  Since  that  time  there  have  been 
numerous  attempts  at  restoration,  which  not  only  proved  futile,  but 
also  have  served  to  increase  the  jealousies  and  enmities  among  the 
several  States. 

The  attitude  toward  the  question  of  confederation  which  the 
United  States  adopted  at  the  outset  and  has  continued  ever  since,  was 
expressed  by  Secretary  Seward  in  1863,  as  follows: 

The  President  regards  the  agitation  of  the  question  of  a  reunion  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  Republics  with  favor,  not,  however,  because  he  is  prepared  to 
say  that  the  measure  is  practicable  or  expedient,  but  simply  because  it  indi- 
cates a  conviction  that  there  are  some  common  evils  existing  in  the  several 
States  of  Central  America  which  are  constantly  reproducing  civil  and  inter- 
national wars,  and  a  will  and  a  purpose  on  the  part  of  American  statesmen 
there  to  correct  them,  but — 

He  adds — 

there  is  no  desire  on  the  part  of  the  President  to  seem  to  favor  coercion  in  the 
matter,  and  on  the  contrary,  the  United  States  will  remain  equally  the  friend 
of  the  Central  American  powers  whether  they  .reunite  or  prefer  to  remain  dis- 
tinct and  independent. 

After  repeated  unsuccessful  attempts  to  restore  the  union  an  im- 
pression began  to  be  held  in  the  United  States  that  certain  of  the 
Republics  were  not  so  much  interested  in  the  federation  as  they  were  in 
establishing  their  own  ascendancy  at  the  expense  of  their  neighbors, 
and  that  in  particular  Nicaragua,  which  controlled  the  canal  route, 
appeared  to  be  menaced  by  acts  of  aggression.  Early  in  1880  Secre- 
tary Evarts  instructed  the  American  minister  at  Guatemala  that  the 
United  States  would  not  look  with  favor  on  any  "  schemes  of  aggran- 
dizement" by  which  "the  individuality  of  any  of  the  States  of 
Central  America  would  disappear  in  turmoil  or  conquest,"  but  he 
reiterated  the  settled  policy  of  the  United  States  that  it  would 
regard  with  approbation  "such  an  intimacy  of  union  between  the 
States  of  Central  America  as  would  not  only  secure  their  domestic 
interests  but  render  them  outwardly  strong  against  the  rest  of  the 
world." 

Very  similar  views  were  expressed  by  Secretary  Bayard  in  an 
instruction  of  March  10,  1885,  that  while  the  United  States  "  deems 
advisable  a  voluntary  combination  of  interests  of  the  Central  Ameri- 
can States,  no  display  of  force  on  the  part  of  any  one  or  more  States 
to  coerce  the  others  can  be  countenanced."  And  when  it  began  to  be 
made  clear  that  the  plan  of  restoring  the  union  was  a  mere  pretext 
on  the  part  of  ambitious  tyrants  to  maintain  themselves  in  office  and 
extend  their  power  to  control  the  valuable  possessions  of  neighboring 
States,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States,  while  none  the  less  friendly 
to  the  idea  of  confederation,  nevertheless  became  more  insistent  in 
discountenancing  the  use  of  force  to  bring  it  about.  Thus,  on  Feb- 
ruary 27,  1888,  Secretary iBayard  instructed  our  minister  in  Guate- 
mala as  follows : 

I  learn  that  much  disquietude  is  fell  in  Nicaragua  by  reason  of  rumors  that 
the  plan  of  consolidation  or  amalgamation  of  the  Central  American  Republics, 
which  received  so  serious  a  check  when  undertaken  by  Gen.  Barrios  a  few 
years  ago,  is  proposed  to  be  revived  by  his  successor,  Gen.  Barillas.  *  *  * 

The  great  interest  expressed  in  the  proposed  construction  of  the  interoceanic 
canal  by  citizens  of  the  United  States,  under  charter  granted  according  to  the 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  27 

laws  of  the  United  States,  and  the  concern  naturally  felt  for  the  security  of  the 
vast  capital  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  such  a  work  under  effective 
guaranties  of  stability  and  order,  should  serve  to  advise  the  statesmen  of 
Guatemala  of  the  new  and  important  enterprises  thus  inaugurated,  and  lead 
them  to  realize  the  magnitude  of  the  concern  which  would  necessarily  be  felt 
should  any  ill-counseled  plans  of  domination  or  control  cast  a  doubt  upon  the 
capacity  of  the  independent  Central  American  States  to  maintain  orderly  and 
local  self-government,  and  to  observe  relations  of  good  will  toward  each 
other.  *  *  * 

You  will  carefully  inquire  whether  any  ground  exists  for  the  apprehensions 
to  which  I  have  adverted,  and  will  likewise  take  an  early  and  discreet  occasion 
to  convey  to  the  Government  of  President  Barillas  the  views  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  which  are  consistently  and  strongly  in  disapproval  of  a 
coercive  union  of  the  Central  American  Republics  and  favorable  to  their  inde- 
pendent, tranquil,  and  harmonious  continuance  under  the  reign  of  constitutional 
law. 

The  question  might  well  be  asked  why  it  is  that  so  little  progress 
toward  a  permanent  union  has  been  made,  notwithstanding  the  evi- 
dent advantages  of  a  single  strong  Republic,  the  popular  sentiment 
favoring  the  idea,  and  the  moral  support  which  the  United  States 
has  always  been  willing  to  lend  to  its  peaceful  achievement.  Experi- 
ence gives  a  reply  by  referring  to  the  sanguinary  struggles  that  mark 
the  abortive  federation  from  1823  until  the  execution  of  Morazan 
in  1842.  Those  20  years  witnessed  such  immense  loss  of  life,  destruc- 
tion of  property,  paralysis  of  commerce  and  agriculture  that  the  mass 
of  the  people,  who  in  the  beginning  had  believed  that  confederation 
would  solve  the  problem  of  peace,  never  desired  to  repeat  the  experi- 
ment, and  took  no  genuine  interest  in  any  of  the  subsequent  attempts, 
regarding  them  as  mere  schemes  of  aggrandizement  by  military  rulers. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  only  reason  or  justification  for  a  union  of  Cen- 
tral America  is  that  under  its  government  the  people  will,  have  a 
greater  assurance  of  stability  of  institutions,  maintenance  of  order, 
and  peaceful  development  of  the  resources  of  the  country,  without  dan- 
ger of  foreign  interference.  For  a  State  to  lead  successfully  in  the 
movement  of  federation  it  must  first  establish  peace  and  order  within 
its  own  confines,  and  not  depend  as  heretofore  on  the  power  of  mili- 
tarism. If  the  pending  canal  treaty  is  put  into  eft'ect  and  Nicaragua 
by  reason  thereof  is  guaranteed  against  future  turbulence,  the  lesson 
will  not  be  without  its  effect  on  the  neighboring  States.  Such  of 
them  as  maintain  stable  governments  and  peaceful  conditions  will 
soon  find  it  to  their  common  interests  to  unite,  and  the  advantages 
of  peace  will  strengthen  Nicaragua  and  perhaps  extend  its  influence, 
or  even  its  limits,  just  as  disorders  weakened  the  Republic  and  caused 
it  to  lose  territory  to  its  neighbor  in  1825,  when  the  inhabitants  of  the 
district  of  Nicoya  petitioned  for  annexation  to  Costa  Rica  in  order 
to  escape  from  the  anarchy  then  prevailing  in  their  own  State. 

Because  of  the  strategic  position  of  the  Central  American  Re- 
publics, commanding  the  northern  approaches  of  the  Panama  Canal 
on  both  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  some  observers  have  expressed 
the  opinion  that  our  interest  is  too  great  not  to  impose  on  our  policy 
the  desirability  of  continuing  the  present  system  of  small  independ- 
ent States,  and  of  preventing  their  union  in  what  under  a  powerful 
dictator  might  become  a  strong  nation,  possibly  antagonistic  to  qur 
policies  and  able  to  invoke  the  intervention  of  foreign  powers. 
Whatever  might  otherwise  be  the  force  of  this  argument,  no  such 
danger  would  be  likely  if  the  United  States  were  in  control  of  the 
canal  route  across  Nicaragua,  together  with  the  naval  base  in  Fonseca 


28  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

Bay,  and  on  the  contrary  our  interests  and  those  of  Central  America 
would  both  be  best  served  by  encouraging  a  union  of  the  five  Re- 
publics, a  result  that  should  be  decided  by  popular  vote  instead  of 
military  force,  and  that  might  be  brought  about  by  voluntary  coales- 
cence with  Nicaragua,  which,  with  peace  guaranteed,  would  become 
the  strongest  and  most  important,  because  of  its  geographically 
strategic  position. 

The  ninth  criticism  is  that  the  whole  present  policy  of  the  United 
States  is  an  offense  to  the  people  of  Nicaragua,  and  is  condemned  by 
the  public  sentiment  of  all  Latin  America. 

There  is  abundant  evidence  to  disprove  this  statement,  even  though 
some  of  the  competent  witnesses  may  not  wish  to  testify  in  public. 
Perhaps  this  may  be  made  clearer  by  a  few  extracts  from  an  interest- 
ing report  to  be  found  in  the  legation  files,  giving  the  substance 
of  a  conversation,  in  December,  1911,  with  a  prominent  Costa  Rican, 
which  was  characterized  with  more  than  usual  frankness.  At 
that  time  Gen.  Mena  was  using  his  position  as  a  cabinet  officer  to 
overthrow  President  Diaz,  and  this  conspiracy  caused  considerable 
unrest  in  Nicaragua,  which  threatened  to  spread  to  the  neighboring 
republics.  Discussing  the  American  policy,  the  speaker  declared 
that  "  from  the  point  of  view  of  Costa  Rica,  it  would  be  of  distinct 
advantage  for  the  United  States  to  be  responsible  for  the  preserva-. 
tton  oforderjn  JNicaragua  and  Honduras.  At  present  conditions  in 

ikel 


countries  were  '  chaos,'  and  likely  to  continue  irrespective  of 
the  party  in  power.  Costa  Rica  was  obliged  to  protect  herself 
against  this,  and  at  the  same  time  watch  those  plotting  revolution 
(against  Nicaragua)  within  her  (Costa  Rica's)  confines.  The  pres- 
ent movement  of  Senor  X  against  the  Mena-Diaz  government  was 
due  to  his  openly  proclaimed  belief  that  the  United  States  would  not 
interfere."  In  reply  the  minister  said  : 

I  stated  our  reluctance  to  interfere,  to  which  he  retorted  "that  we  could  not 
have  our  cake  and  eat  it.  Either  we  should  keep  away  entirely  from  Central 
America  or  else  make  ourselves  effectively  responsible  for  the  preservation  of 
order.  Having  overthrown  the  Zelnya  rfltripip  it  would  be  illogical  to  allow  one 
of  his  acTHerents  to  recover  it."  The  speaker,  who  is  one  of  the  best  informed 
and  most  influential  public  men  of  Central  America  laid  great  stress  on  our 
pending  treaties  with  Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  which  he  regarded  as  the 
salvation  of  the  situation.  He  thought  it  necessary  for  us  to  do  there  as  in 
Santo  Domingo,  though  stating  that  if  these  views  were  known  as  coming  from 
him  they  would  be  regarded  as  treason.  I  remarked  that  our  great  desire  had 
always  been  to  avoid  direct  interference,  and  we  had  once  hoped  that  the 
Central  American  Court  of  Justice  might  prove  a  powerful  factor  in  promoting 
peace.  *  *  *  As  he  aptly  stated,  what  force  would  it  invoke  other  than 
that  of  the  United  States,  and,  if  so,  our  direct  intervention  would  be  far 
preferable.  His  entire  argument  which  he  expounded  logically  and  with  force 
was  in  favor  of  this,  which  is  all  the  more  remarkable  as  the  violence  of  his 
attacks  against  the  United  States  while  he  was  in  *  *  *,  is  still  remembered. 

JThe  great  mass  of  the  people  of  Nicaragua  are  friendly  to  the 
policy  (Jtjihe  United  States.  Public  meetings  have  been  held  to  in- 
doTsertnirvarious  measures,  and  the  national  assembly  has  passed 
the  required  legislation  by  reasonably  ample  majority.  This  official 
action  fairly  represents  popular  sentiment. 

Statements  occasionally  appear  in  print  which  seem  to  indicate  the 
contrary  and  purport  to  express  a  widespread  opinion  of  unfriendli- 
ness, but  on  careful  examination  they  may  be  traced  to  European 
sources  antagonistic  to  the  spread  of  United  States  influence  or  to 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  29 

persons  not  authorized  to  voice  Latin- American  sentiment.  We  are 
so  earnestly  desirous  of  the  good  will  and  friendship  of  the  peoples 
of  the  southern  Republics  that  in  matters  which  concern  them  we 
become  supersensitive  to  unfavorable  comment  without  inquiring 
from  whom  it  proceeds  and  are  apt  to  ascribe  an  exaggerated  im- 
portance to  random  and  irresponsible  "protests."  Every  bandit 
leader  along  the  Mexican  border  would  have  us  believe  that  any 
interference  with  his  lawlessness  is  resented  by  the  public  sentiment 
of  Central  and  South  America.  During  the  recent  disorders  in 
Nicaragua,  \vhen  Mena  and  some  of  his  alleged  generals  were  com- 
pelled by  United  States  marines  to  desist  from  plundering  and  de- 
stroying American  property,  he  threatened  to  bring  down  en  our 
heads  the  vengeance  of  "  all  Latin  America." 

A  characteristic  example  of  the  same  kind  of  arrogance  and  ef- 
frontery appears  in  a  recent  pamphlet  dealing  with  Nicaraguan 
affairs,  as  follows: 

The  Monroe  doctrine,  as  \ve  have  related  before,  was  willingly  accepted  by 
the  peoples  of  all  Latin  America;  but  when  later  on  an  amplification  wus 
invented  to  signify  the  right  of  tutelage  of  the  United  States  of  North  America 
over  the  other  Republics  of  the  continent  this  interpretation,  odious,  arbitrary, 
and  pernicious  to  all  Latin  America,  met  with  vigorous  protest  in  all  Latin 
America,  where  public  opinion  was  unanimous  in  expressing  itself,  etc. 

Fortunately  for  our  peace  of  mind,  this  pronouncement  did  net 
emanate  from  the  ABC  powers,  but  investigation  showed  that  the 
self -constituted  spokesman  of  "  all  Latin  America  "  was  a  Russian. 
Centers  of  propaganda  for  the  dissemination  of  this  sort  of  stutf 
a  re  established  in  Central  America  and  at  New  Orleans.  They  origi- 
nated the  Root  forgery  wrhich  caused  so  much  annoyance  to  the 
then  Senator  from  New  York.  A  document  pretended  to  quote  him 
as  favoring  a  policy  of  territorial  aggressirn  and  a  military  over- 
lordship  of  the  entire  continent  by  the  United  States.  It  was  so 
manifestly  a  forgery  that  a  denial  of  it  by  Senator  Roct  was  hardly 
necessary,  although  he  did  deny  it  in  January,  1913,  so  that  those 
circulating  the  libel  might  have  no  pretense  that  its  authenticity 
was  questionable.  Of  course  they  continued  to  circulate  it  after  its 
falsity  wras  established.  In  New  Orleans  the  junta  is  composed  of 
a  Honduran  revolutionist,  a  German,  and  a  Russian,  all  of  them 
beneficiaries  of  Zelaya. 

•  In  Central  America  the  self-appointed  defenders  of  Nicaraguan 
sovereignty  are  mostly  fugitive  Cubans,  Colombians,  and  Venezue- 
lans. One  of  them,  Masso  Parra,  a  Cuban,  was  brought  to  Nicaragua 
by  interested  parties,  and  started  a  disturbance  on  March  6.  1913, 
near  Managua,  to  ascertain  if  the  new  administration  at  Washington 
had  changed  the  Taft  policy  in  regard  to  discountenancing  revolution. 
After  the  marines  had  suppressed  him  the  legation  became  interested 
in  his  case  and  looked  up  his  record,  with  the  following  results: 
Masso  Parra  was  director  of  police  under  Zelaya,  who  sent  him  to  the 
United  States  to  be  cured  of  a  wound  which  had  left  him  lame. 
There  he  was  convicted  and  sent  to  Sing  Sing  for  counterfeiting, 
whence  he  escaped  and  returned  to  Central  America.  At  Managua 
he  was  arrested  for  obtaining  money  under  false  pretenses  while 
ostensibly  raffling  a  mule.  During  the  Mena  revolution  he  was  com- 
missioned as  an  officer  under  Baca.  By  birth  he  is  a  Spaniard  and 
began  his  military  career  in  Cuba,  being  enrolled  in  the  Spanish 


30  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

forces  that  from  1896  to  1898  attempted  to  put  down  the  Cuban 
revolution.  Spain  having  lost,  he  remained  for  a  time  in  Cuba,  then 
went  to  the  United  States,  where  he  had  a  precarious  existence.  In 
1906  he  was  engaged  in  a  piratical  expedition  organized  in  New  York 
against  Costa  Rica.  He  entered  into  an  agreement  with  Capt.  Bo}rn- 
ton,  a  notorious  adventurer  who  had  figured  in  many  Cuban  and 
Venezuelan  filibuster  enterprises,  to  arm  and  equip  a  merchant  vessel 
in  a  harbor  of  the  United  States  and  then  to  seize  Port  Limon,  in 
Costa  Rica,  which  had  only  a  small  garrison,  to  rob  the  custom- 
house, then  surprise  the  capital  and  after  cracking  the  banks  make 
their  escape,  realizing  of  course  it  would  be  impossible  to  maintain 
themselves  for  any  length  of  time.  The  plan  became  known  and 
was  easily  frustrated. 

Masso  Parra  then  returned  to  Cuba  and  during  the  second  Ameri- 
can occupation  formed  a  plot  to  assassinate  Gov.  Magoon  and  other 
prominent  persons.  It  was  said  the  object  was  to  restore  Spanish 
rule,  but,  of  course,  Spain  disavowed  the  attempt.  Those  implicated 
were  arrested  and  tried,  Masso  being  sentenced  to  five  years  in  the 
penitentiary.  But  he  remained  there  only  two  years,  his  sentence 
being  commuted  on  the  departure  of  Mr.  Magoon.  He  was  after- 
wards taken  to  Nicaragua  and  started  on  a  career  of  looting  in 
undefended  villages,  and  when  at  last  driven  out,  resumed  connec- 
"ion  with  the  propaganda  to  defend  the  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua 
[gainst  the  United  States. 

Whatever  criticism  may  be  made  of  the  Knox  policy  in  Nicaragua, 
it  stands  the  one  true  tost  of  diplomacy—  success  ;  and  trie  JLJepa  r  t  - 
ment  of  State  must  be  given  credit  for  affirmative,  energetic,  con- 


structive action,  tree  from  ail  traces  of  opportunism.     The  United 
StateslooK:  a  stand  squarely  and  without  comromisii~on  the  side 


rom  ail  traces  o    opporunsm. 
quarely  and  without  compromisii 

of  peiree  and  constitutional  order  in  Central  AmericaTand  for  the 
protection"^)  f  American  citizens  abroad.  A  cleclarationr  of  policy 
was  made  tram  time  10  time  in  formal  Tngpitiprif^rinTj  f^pr.  words 
were  followed  by  deeds.  In  view  of  our  attitude  toward  Zelaya, 
and  the  whole  of  our  relations  to  Nicaragua  and  Central  America, 
we  could  hardly  have  done  otherwise  than  earnestly  discountenance 
the  conspirators  who  had  adopted  such  methods  as  had  Mena  and  his 
followers.  The  origin  and  conduct  of  their  plot  gave  to  the  partici- 
pants the  character  of  bandits  raiding  American  property,  rather 
than  revolutionists  fighting  for  a  principle,  and  created  on  a  small 
scale  a  situation  in  Nicaragua  not  without  analogy  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  Boxers  in  China.  In  these  circumstances  it  became  the  duty 
of  the  United  States  not  tqleave  American  lite~lHcTpropei-ty  at  the 
mercy  ot  such  lawless  elements.  It  was  none  the  less  our  duty  ""to 
restrain  Lhe  offenders  with  force  ot  arms,  li  necessary,  instead  of 


collecting  indemnities  after  the  damage  Was  dorreTlmd  thereby  in- 
flicfing  punishment  on  the  innocent  and  helpless  mass~of  the  people. 
This  was  all  the  more  imperative  as  tlie  conspirators  had  proclaimed, 
with  amazing  insolence,  that  the  United  States  would  be  compelled 
to  accept  "  hechos  consumados,"  or,  in  plain  language,  that  our 
Government  would  meekly  submit  to  accomplished  facts,  irrespective 
of  considerations  of  honor  and  justice. 

Hence,  on  the  invitation  of  the  Nicaraguan  Government  to  land 
marines  to  protect  our  citizens,  the  first  moderate  measures  were  taken 
it  was  hoped  would  speedily  have  the  effect  of  putting  an  end 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA.  31 

to  disturbance,  and  would  have  the  indirect  result  of  enabling  the 
lawful  Government,  thus  freed  to  a  great  extent,  not  from  the 
responsibility  but  from  the  work  of  actual  protection  of  Americans, 
to  bring  most  of  its  forces  directly  to  bear  upon  the  suppression  of 
the  uprising.  In  order  that  foreign  life  and  property  might  enjoy 
complete  safety'atlhe^  forces'  WoutTbe 

able  to  retire  after  the  least  delay,  and  the  moral  effect  uponThe  whole 
revolution-ridden  region  of  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  should 
be  the  greatest,  it  was  especially  desirable  to  stimulate  the  efforts  of 
the  constitutional  government  of  Nicaragua  to  restore  its  authority 
throughout  the  couhtry.  It  was  further  believer!  t.hnf  if~rfig_TTnifprl 
States  did  its  auFv^pTomptly.  thoroughly,  anTinripresswplyJ^" 


;— -  • f     ~-j'      T  "•- •---  -"OP  ^7      ?          «.***"-          ^-M.*.-M.j^  J-    V-.*.^!.      .     VfJ  ^^  -*- 

ragua  it  would  strengthen  our  hand  and  lighten  our  task  not,  only  in 
« icaragua  itself  but  throughout  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
We  were  having  so  much  trouble  in  some  of  tnose  countries,~and  we 
had  been  obliged  for  so  long  frequently  to  express  "  grave  concern," 
to  lodge  protests,  and  to  threaten  with  personal  and  "  strict  account- 
ability "  the  numerous  bandit  leaders,  that  the  authority  of  our  words 
seemed  weakened.  The  lesson  needed  to  be  taught  to  Central  America 
that 'the  good  faith  oTthe  UnitecfStates  was  not  to  be  treatedlighTTy. 
and  that  the  solemn  pledges  given  to  its  representalTvelTlnTrsirbe 
respectea:.  To  have  sat  idly  by  after  Mena  had  affronted  the  Ameri- 
can Government  by  breaking^faTth  with  its  minister,  and  j.ohnve  seen 
his  treachery  triumph  would  have  been  a  blow  to  our  prestrge"TTi  all 
the_ neighboring  Republics.  Moreover,  the  downfall  of  thg  TTT^fnl 
government  and  the  inauguration  of  another  Zelaya  regime  by  Mena 
would  not  only  have  given  rise  to  further  contentions  in  Nicaragua, 
but  if  would  also  have  caused  the  spread  of  disorder  throughout  Cen- 
tral AmericaTan^r^ 
since  Huerta  by  similar  treachery  seized  tfte  power  in  that  couhtry. 

It  is  customary  to  say  of  certain  of  the  turbulent  Latin- American 
Republics  that  what  they  need  is  a  "  strong  "  man  at  the  helm,  mean- 
ing a  ruthless  despot  of  the  type  of  Zelaya,  who  maintained  himself 
in  power  for  a  great  many  years  by  military  tyranny,  and  so  long  as 
he  prevented  the  people's  cry  of  discontent  from  reaching  the  outside 
world,  was  given  credit  for  preserving  "peace";  and  after  he  suc- 
ceeded in  enriching  himself  and  a  favored  few  among  the  natives 
and  foreigners  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  who  were  kept  in  a  con- 
dition of  servitude  called  peonage,  was  praised  by  his  sycophants 
for  promoting  the  "  prosperity  "  of  the  country. 

A  different  type  of  President  is  represented  by  Don  Adolf o  Diaz. 
He  is  a  civilian  of  mild  manner,  without  military  training,  and 
though  a  plain  man  of  affairs,  was  called  a  dreamer  and  visionary 
because  he  believed  in  the  principle  that  the  people  could  be  fitted  by 
education  to  have  a  voice  in  the  affairs  of  government  rather  than 
forced  by  violence  to  submit  to  the  rule  of  a  few. 

He  not  only  freed  Nicaragua  from  the  corrupt  Zelaya  regime, 
which  had  fattened  on  the  people  for  17  years,  but  also  prevented 
the  infliction  of  an  equally  detestable  system,  sought  to  be  imposed  by 
Gen.  Mena,  another  of  the  "  strong  "  type  of  men.  Although  Diaz 
was  oniy  31  years  of  age  when  he  first  undertook  the  task  of  elimi- 
nating Zelaya,  he  had  already  made  a  name  for  himself  as  a  suc- 
cessful well-to-do  business  man  in  Bluefields,  on  the  Atlantic  coast, 

451646 


32  AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    NICARAGUA. 

where  he  first  came  into  contact  with  Americans  and  learned  to 
admire  their  energy  and  progressive  methods.  He  is  one  of  the  few 
Central  American  leaders  in  recent  memory  who,  representing  the 
real  sentiment  of  those  people,  is  fearless  and  outspoken  in  his 
friendship  and  admiration  for  the  United  States,  though  there  are 
many,  as  the  records  of  the  department  will  show,  who  profess  their 
good  will,  but  for  political  reasons  prefer  "  not  to  be  quoted."  Real 
friendship  should  be  reciprocated  and  not  penalized  by  us. 

Diaz's  successful  leadership  has  been  a  source  of  surprise  to  casual 
observers,  who  have  seen  Zelaya  and  the  other  generals  like  Mena 
give  way  in  turn  to  a  mere  civilian,  who  has  no  large  military  fol- 
lowing but  is  dependent  for  his  power  on  his  ability  and  the  confi- 
dence which  he  inspires  in  the  people.  Willing  to  listen  patiently  to 
the -counsel  of  those  around  him,  some  of  whom  no  doubt  are  self- 
seeking,  he  has  endeavored  to  select  the  best  they  had  to  offer,  though, 
unfortunately,  not  always  able  to  counteract  the  worst.  Yet  by  tact 
and  perseverance  he  has  accomplished  remarkable  results  of  a  de- 
cidedly constructive  character;  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  much 
remains  to  be  accomplished  and  many  abuses  are  yet  to  be  corrected 
before  Nicaragua  can  be  said  to  have  recovered  from  the  17  years' 
blight  of  Zelaya. 

Under  the  Diaz  administration .. Jjnancial  reorganization  has  pro- 
gressed in  the  face  of  adv~r«p  firmimstanops^the  new  currency  system 
has  been  put  into  effect  on  a  sound-money,  gold-exchange  basis;  the 
fluctuations  in  the  unit  of  value,  so  prevalent  in  some  of  the  Latin  - 
American  countries,  and  so  injurious  to  our  commerce  with  them. 
have  been  abolished,  and  thejiew  standard  of  money,  called  the  "  Cor- 
doba,"  has  been  placed  on  an~exact  equivalent  basis  with  the  gold  dol- 
lar of  the  United  States;  a  national  bank,  the  only  institution  of  the 
kind  in  the  whole  country,  Ms  been  organized  and  branches  opened  in 
the  leading  cities  of  the  Republic ;  the  customs  have  been  collected  with, 
such  efficiency  that  the  receipts,  notwithstanding  the  Mena  disturb- 
ances,  increased  over  all  past  records ;  part  of  thepublic  debtjias  been 
refunded  at  a  more  favorable  rate  of  interest;  the  tariri,  which,  like  the 
currency*,  had  previously  differed  on  the  Atlantic  ami  Pacific  coasts, 
was  revised  and  made  uniform  throughout  the  country ;  thousand§_pf 
claims  have  been  adjusted  by  the  mixed-claims  commission;  political 
amnesty  has  been  granted  and  militarism  abolished :  the  army  has  been 
subordinated  to  its  proper  functions  by  the  appointment  as  minister  of 
war  of  a  trained  officer  and  civil  engineer,  who  is  a  Nicaraguan  gradu- 
ate of  West  Point  and  highly  respected  for  his  integrity  and  ability ; 
common-school  education  has  been  extended  and  liberty  of  speech  and 
press  inaugurated;  the  railroad  management  has  been  improved  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  49  per  cent  of  the  shares  held  by  the  Govern- 
ment produced  more  revenue  for  the  public  treasury  than  the  total. 
/--.  shares  under  the  old  system,  and  this  notwithstanding  betterments* 
/  of  roadbed  and  installation  of  new  rolling  stock,  including  oil-fuel 
locomotives  to  replace  the  old,  dilapidated  wood-burning  engines; 
and,  finally,  a  new  transcontinental  railroad  has  been  projected  to 
connect  Bluefields  with  Managua. 

To  appreciate  what  this  railroad  means,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in 
mind  that  the  east  and  west  coasts  of  Nicaragua,  owing  to  differences 
of  climate  and  physical  features,  are  populated  by  different  races. 


AMERICAN   POLICY   IN    NICAEAGUA.  33 

having  a  different  history,  speaking  a  different  language,  professing 
a  different  religion,  and,  until  recently,  being  governed  under  differ- 
ent tariff  and  currency  systems.  Bluefields  has  more  interests,  com- 
mercial and  otherwise,  with  the  United  States  than  it  has  with  the 
interior  of  Nicaragua,  owing  to  good  shipping  facilities  with  New 
Orleans  and  the  lack  of  inland  communication.  It  is  pervaded  with 
a  strong  American  influence  and  is  free  from  the  bitter  political 
feeling  that  exists  in  the  western  part  of  the  country.  Diaz,  who 
was  for  many  years  a  resident  of  Bluefields,  having  property  inter- 
ests there,  believes  that  the  construction  of  a  transcontinental  rail- 
road would  bring  about  the  unification  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
sections  of  Nicaragua,  and,  by  introducing  new  commercial  interests 
as  the  result  of  direct  communication  with  the  United  States,  would 
tend  to  the  development  of  a  national  spirit  in  place  of  sectionalism 
and  to  the  lessening  of  the  animosities  which  exist  between  Leon  and 
Granada. 

The  beauty  and  natural  advantages  of  those  two  cities  are  sur- 
passed only  by  the  evil  of  their  politics  and  the  bitterness  of  their 
feuds.  But  these  very  qualities  are  indicative  of  strength  that  is 
misdirected,  and  if  the  people,  with  their  many  admirable  traits  of 
character,  could  be  brought  to  work  in  harmony  they  would  prove 
capable  of  building  a  strong  Commonwealth.  It  is  the  politicians 
who  find  selfish  advantage  in  keeping  alive  the  rancors  and  hatreds 
of  a  dead  past,  and  their  influence  must  be  overcome  by  education 
and  by  making  commerce  and  industry  more  attractive  than  politics. 
When  the  people  have  outgrown  their  narrow  provincialism  the  two 
cities  will  rapidly  become  the  largest  and  most  prosperous  in  Central 
America.  Construction  of  the  transcontinental  railroad  would 
greatly  contribute  to  this  result,  and  is  one  of  the  purposes  contem- 
plated by  our  present  policy,  merely  awaiting  the  necessary  funds 
that  will  become  available  with  the  passage  of  the  canal  treaty  now 
pending  in  the  Senate. 

It  is  not  without  significance  that  this  treaty,  originally  negotiated 
by  Secretary  Knox,  was  afterwards  adopted  in  a  modified  form  by 
Secretary  Bryan,  and  is  now  being  urged  by  Secretary  Lansing. 
Such  unanimity  of  opinion  on  the  merits  of  a  measure  has  not 
always  marked  the  handling  of  international  affairs,  but  is  quite  in 
keeping  with  the  history  of  the  development  of  our  policy  in  Nica- 
ragua, which  has  been  consistently  adhered  to  except  in  1885,  when 
President  Cleveland  withdrew  from  the  consideration  of  the  Senate 
the  Frelinghuysen-Zavala  canal  treaty,  negotiated  during  his  prede- 
cessor's administration,  and  even  that  exception  related  to  the  method 
and  not  to  the  principle,  for  he  afterwards  supported  the  proposed 
construction  of  the  interoceanic  waterway  by  American  citizens  under 
charter  granted  by  act  of  Congress. 

The  pending  treaty  is,  therefore,  in  harmony  with  our  historical 
policy,  and  signifies  not  only  an  option  on  a  canal  strip  and  the  acqui- 
sition of  a  naval  station  in  Fonseca  Bay  as  a  measure  of  preparedness 
for  the  protection  of  the  Panama  Canal,  but  also  affords  the  means 
for  the  preservation  of  order  in  Nicaragua,  for  the  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  its  resources,  unvexed  by  foreign  interference,  and  for  its 
attainment  of  a  higher  place  in  the  family  of  American  Republics. 


S.  Doc.  334,  64-1  -  3 


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